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In March, 1917, the Romanovs, one of the greatest 
royal families of Europe, ceased to rule. Within a few 
short months, the entire structure of Russian society 
had been drastically altered. For a few brief months 
Russia experimented with a form of democracy, and that, 
too, was swept away. The 1917 Russian Revolution was 
truly one of the great events in the history of the 
West, having tremendous consequences for our century. 
The causes of so great an event must be many and varied;, 
however, this much seems certain: the persuasive at-
tempts of the Bolsheviks contributed to their eventual 
success. Their use of persuasion was based on the ideas 
of their great leader, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better 
known by his revolutionary pseudonym, Lenin. It is the 
purpose of this study to examine and present the ideas 
of persuasion as a revolutionary strategy as they ap-
pear in Lenin's written works. 
Perhaps a brief discussion of the events leading 
up to 1917 would place this study in its proper per-
l 
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spective. Russia was a country suffering constant fer-
ment in the nineteenth century; whether the ferment was 
overt or covert depended on the policies of each czar. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia was 
by all Western standards a backward countryo Peter the 
Great had started the land on the road to westernization 
and industrialization a century before, but she still 
lagged far behind the rest of Europe. Russia was almost 
entirely an agrarian country, a land of great estates 
worked by peasants who were bound to the land--the in-
stitution known as serfdom. Yet, not even Russia es-
caped the effects of the French Revolution, and many 
liberal ideas found their way into her intellectual 
class. 
When Czar Alexander I died the first major inci-
dent indicating discontent broke out: the Decembrist 
Revolution of 1825. It was a poorly organized, poorly 
conceived, and abortive revolt, but some martyrs were 
made, symbols which subsequent revolutionaries could 
and did utilizea Under Alexander's successor, his_ 
brother Nicholas I, liberal concepts were mercilessly 
suppressed; his reign was a reactionary one. However, 
defeat in the Crimean War proved the need for change in 
internal policies. 
Nicholas was succeeded by Alexander II, who was 
the first czar to enact any of the liberals' ideas. It 
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was during his reign that serfdom was abolished, for 
which he became known as the Czar Liberator. However, 
the conditions of emancipation were such that many peas-
ants were little better off than before; the conditions 
for obtaining land were difficult and harsh in relation 
to the peasants' ability to pay. 
The emancipation of the serfs created a condition 
crucial for Russian development: it allowed an indus-
trial laboring class to develop. While the serfs were 
tied to their land, there was little labor supply in 
the cities, therefore little chance of i~dustrializa-
tion. With the freeing of the serfs, industries could 
be established, and soon were; huge industries, built 
with governmental subsidization, they did not evolve 
from numerous small plants, but were originally built as 
tremendous structures. Thus, by 1917, the Russian econ-
omy was marked by relatively few industrial complexes, 
but those few were huge by any standard. Their size 
became crucial later when a strike broke out, for exam-
ple, at the Thornton textile works, or some other fac-
tory. Even though only one factory may have been in-
volved, the strike still affected a sizable portion of 
the Russian economy. However, the industrial develop-
ment was only beginning during the reign of Alexander 
II. 
As the face of Russia was drastically changing, 
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the political structure remained relatively static. The 
changes were directed almost entirely from above; the 
Russian czar remained an autocrat. In fact, even during 
the reign of Nicholas II there was no Prime Minister as 
such; each minister was responsible individually and 
independently to the czar, a situation which created 
much intra-cabinet rivalry. Russia underwent none of 
the liberal or democratic development in government 
which Western Europe had experienced. There was no par-
liament, there were no national elections, indeed, there 
usually was tight censorship which attempted to keep outi 
all liberal ideas. Although Alexander II instituted a 
number of reforms--for example, he reorganized the army, 
I 
reduced military service, and instituted trial by jury--
the government was carefully kept autocratic. All re-
forms were by the whim of the czar, and could be revoked 
at will. 
Naturally, many of those who had come into contact 
with Western ideas were dissatisfiedo Since there was 
no opposition in government, no legal newspapers or 
journals for voicing opposition, no freedom of assembly, 
any who firmly held opposing convictions were forced to 
operate underground against the government. There was 
no chance of influencing the government from the out-
side, so the only hope was to overthrow it, and that was 
precisely what many concluded. An alienated group of 
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intellectuals developed in Russia, and it was through 
that group that revolutionary ideas were introduced into 
I 
and spread throughout the country. 
A number of attempts on the life of Alexander II 
were made and finally, in 1881, the revolutionaries 
succeeded. He was replaced by his son, Alexander III, 
who, reacting to the murder of his father, tightened the 
control over the entire country. The revolutionary 
intelligentsia were ruthlessly hunted and imprisoned, 
exiled or executed. Alexander III's reign was a period 
of reaction. Russia experienced further economic devel-
opment, but liberal ideas were excluded from the gov-
ernment, economy, and, indeed, the entire country. 
Alexander III died in 1894 and was succeeded by 
his son, Nicholas II, the last of the Romanovs. Nich-
olas seems to have been generally unfit to rule a great 
empire: 
through~ 
he could not make decisions and carry them 
His advisers constantly suffered because he 
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often told each one simply what he thought that one 
wanted to hear. As is well known, his son was a hemo-
philiac, which eventually caused Nicholas to come under 
the complete control of the notorious monk Rasputin. 
Nicholas' unhappy reign was marked by several 
crucial events. The first was the Russo-Japanese War, 
which went very badly for Russia. While the war was an 
indecisive one, it nevertheless proved that Japan could 
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stop the huge Russian empire, that an Asian nation was 
at least the equal of a European one. The war was an 
unpopular one in Russia, largely because it was unsuc-
cessful. Furthermore, the nation was asked to make 
economic sacrifices to keep up war production. Labor 
unrest, as a result, increased until in January, 1905, 
Father Gapon led a peaceful group of laborers to the 
Winter Palace to present a petition to Nicholas asking 
that he redress certain grievances. For some reason, 
as the massed workers stood in front of the Palace, the 
guards opened fire; the day was known thereafter as 
Bloody Sunday. For the first time a significant number, 
of Russians concluded that the czar was not afterall 
their father-benefactor. This massacre marked a turning 
point in Russian history. 
After Bloody Sunday, revolution broke out in ear-
nest marked by an event unique in European history: a 
general strike. By October the internal unrest had 
grown so great that Czar Nicholas II was forced to make 
some concessions and, in the famous October Manifesto, 
he promised civil liberties and an elected Duma or par-
liament. The Duma began Russia's short experiment with 
democracy. In 1906 election regulations were enacted 
by the czar and elections were held for the first Duma. 
The czar had retained significant powers for himself, 
giving little real authority to parliament; neverthe-
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less, he thought the first Duma too liberal and dis-
solved it. A second Duma was elected, more liberal than 
the first, and it was quickly dissolved. In 1907 the 
laws were changed to give the aristocracy the deciding 
voice in elections, and a third Duma was elected which 
met for three years. In 1912 the fourth Duma was elec-
ted and met until March, 1917. 
Out of the 1905 Revolution one other institution 
emerged which was to play a crucial role in Russian his-
tory: the Soviet. In St. Petersburg the laborers or 
proletariat formed a council (Soviet) to direct and co-
ordinate their actions. The Soviet constituted a rival 
authority to the government. It elected as its presi-
dent Lev Davidovitch Bronstein, better known by his rev-
olutionary pseudonym, Leon Trotsky. 
From 1907 to 1914 there were few events of remark-
able significance. The revolutionary groups attempted 
to work among the people, propagandizing for their ide-
ologies, and the government attempted to break up the 
groups. By 1912, however, war was threatening Europe, 
and in 1914 it broke out in full force. The First World 
War was to be the downfall of czarist Russia. 
The war had devastating effects on Russia. The 
Russian army suffered incredible losses. The Russian 
economy was almost entirely converted to war production, 
with disastrous resultsa The cities and the army de-
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pended on the peasants to produce their food. However, 
as the economy was transformed for war production, con-
sumer goods became increasingly scarce. Consequently, 
there was less and less for the peasants to purchase 
with the money they received for their products. Final- 1 
ly, the government liquor monopoly seems to have pro-
vided the major available product. During the course 
of the war, however, Rasputin persuaded the czar to for-
bid the sale of liquor, claiming it had demoralizing 
effects on the populace. There was, finally, almost no 
incentive for the peasants to sell their products since 
there was almost nothing for them to purchase. There-
fore, the peasants were probably as well off as ever 
before, having far more than enough meat and grain for 
their own consumption, while the cities and army went 
hungry. The economy was also run down, as capital equip-
ment wore out and was not replaced, since nearly all 
immediate production was devoted to war materials. By 
1917 the economy was in almost complete collapse. 
The autocracy could not survive the combined ef-
fects of military disasters, demoralization at the 
course of the war, a broken economy, and loss of respect 
for the government due largely to the image of Rasputin. 
In March the people of St. Petersburg revolted, a Pro-
visional Government was established on the basis of the 
Duma, and the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, 
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Nicholas II, abdicated; the Romanov line had ended. 
Simultaneously with the Provisional Government, Soviets 
were established once again. There followed a period 
of dual authority in Russia. The Soviet in St. Peters-
burg seems to have had the actual power, but the Pro-
visional Government had the claim to legitimacy. The 
Provisional Government reigned, the Soviet ruled. Nei-
ther desired to overthrow the other, and anarchy re-
sulted. 
Into the chaos in Russia stepped the leader of the 
Bolsheviks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Lenin had exhibited 
revolutionary tendencies as early as his student days in, 
Kazan, but did not actually enter the practice of revo-
lution as a profession until 1894 when he went to St. 
Petersburg to practice law. He joined the Social Demo-
crats there, and in 1896 was arrested, along with most 
of his 1 group, when the first edition of their new news-
paper was being distributed. He spent an entire year 
in prison before being sentenced to three years• exile 
in Siberia. Lenin spent these three years rather pleas-
antly, as the town to which he was sent had a reasonable 
climate and Krupskaya, whom he married, was exiled to 
the same town. 
After his term ended, Lenin returned to St~ Peters-
burg, but soon left Russia for the greater freedom of 
Western Europe. He spent the years until 191? in the 
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West, writing, organizing, planning, fighting party 
battles with other Russian intellectuals, and generally 
attempting to build a group that could take power in 
Russia if a favorable situation presented itself. 
When the March Revolution broke out, Lenin, then 
in Switzerland, naturally desired to return to Russia. 
Arrangements were made with the German government for 
Lenin and a number of other socialists to travel in a 
sealed railroad car to Russia via Sweden and Finland. 
Thus it was that in April, 1917, he arrived at the Fin-
land Station in St. Petersburg, returning to a hero's 
welcome. Immediately he went to work condemning the 
Provisional Government, urging the Bolsheviks to pre-
pare to take power for themselves. Lenin's personality 
was an overwhelming one; within a few weeks he had 
changed the course of the Bolshevik Party to his way of 
I 
thinking. (During his absence the Party had to exer-
cise a great deal of independence from the foreign cen-
ter in day-to-day decisionsa In April, all the leaders 
of the faction in Russia were against Lenin's stand on 
the war, and his attitude toward the Provisional Govern-
ment. Within a short time, he had converted them all.) 
In July there was a disturbance, perhaps designed 
to take power from the Provisional Government, which 
many attributed to the Bolsheviks. Lenin was, forced to 
go into hiding in Finland; Bolshevik prestige for the 
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moment sank. Within a few weeks, however, their support 
returned, and, when General Kornilov made an abortive 
attempt to establish a military dictatorship, the Bol-
sheviks emerged as a truly strong party. By the end of 
October they were ready to take power. On the night of 
November 6 (N.s.)1 they assumed power from their head-
quarters in the Smolny Institute; Lenin returned from 
Vyborg to head the Soviet governmente The Bolsheviks 
were successful in obtaining power in St. Petersburg 
and in many of the major cities quite rapidly, but con-
trol over the countryside was not to be won without a 
bloody civil war. Nevertheless, by the middle of Novem-
ber, the revolution was successfully completed in the 
centers of power and the machinery of government was in 
Bolshevik handse 
Throughout the entire period summarized above the 
revolutionary intelligentsia made innumerable attempts 
to persuade the populace to become revolutionary also~ 
From the 11 To the People" movements of the 187O's to the 
Bolsheviks' final victory in the civil war, one of the 
major weapons used by all of the intelligentsia was 
persuasion of one variety or another. Lenin himself 
made numerous attempts to persuade many and varied au-
diences, from Party caucuses to massed workers or peas-
1For an explanation of dating systems see infra, 
pp. 14-15. 
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ants. Furthermore, for many the use of persuasion was 
a conscious action, well thought out in advance, and so 
it was for Lening Throughout his revolutionary career, 
that is, from 1894 to his death in 1924, Lenin wrote 
often of persuasion and persuasive strategies. It is 
such writings that this study will center upon, pre-
senting and examining Lenin's theory of persuasion as a 
revolutionary strategy. 
Approach Taken 
At no time did Lenin systematically present his 
theory of persuasion as a revolutionary strategy. His 
writings on the subject appear throughout his written 
works, usually in connection with another specific sub-
' ject. Lenin at no time wrote an entire "theory of 
.rhetoric" but when, for example, a comrade was impris-
oned and asked for advice Lenin replied indicating the 
manner in which he should use his trial to the best--
i.e., most persuasive--advantage. Lenin's theory of 
persuasion appears in the larger context of politics, 
rather than as a self-contained rhetorical theory. 
Lenin usually wrote in refutation and therefore per-
suasion as a subject was almost always secondary. 
Thus, this study will take the entirety of Lenin's 
written works and select material relevant to persua-
sion. The approach taken in this study is generally a 
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descriptive and analytical one. We will extract from 
Lenin's works his discussions of persuasion as a revo-
lutionary strategy, present them here in a somewhat 
more systematic manner, and analyze them. 
This writer realizes that a maJor danger of such 
a method lies in the fact that much of the material pre-
sented must be taken out of context. That is, Lenin did 
not present a theory of persuasion, but discussed per-
suasion on many different occasions and in relation to 
many different specific situations. Hence, a systematic 
presentation may distort Lenin's actual thought by the 
very fact that it is systematic. However, there appear 
to be no real problems in consistency when this is done. 
Lenin's thought, at least after 1902, seems consistent, 
and therefore seems to be systematic, even though in 
his writings it was not presented systematically. There-
fore, the writer believes that this danger has been 
avoided. 
Sources 
Many studies have dealt with propaganda, and many 
propaganda studies have dealt with Russian propaganda. 
However, all such works which this writer consulted de-
voted, at most, one chapter to Lenin's use of propa-
ganda and at best merely mentioned his theory of propa-
ganda and agitation, around which this study will re-
volve. These studies then moved on to consider propa-
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ganda under Stalin or Hitler. Almost no,attention was 
given to Lenin and less to his thought. Therefore, the 
writer had to turn almost exclusively to Lenin's own 
works. 
The edition of Lenin's Collected Works which was 
used was printed by two Moscow publishing houses, Prog-
ress Publishers and the Foreign Languages Publishing 
House. It totals thirty-eight volumes, which appeared 
from 1960 through 1967. Volumes one through nineteen 
and volume thirty-eight were published by the Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, appearing from 1960 through 
1963; volumes twenty through thirty-seven were published' 
by Progress Publishers from 1964 through 196?. 2 
Two notations must be made about this edition. 
The translator used British spellings rather than Amer-
ican, and quotations appearing in this study will natu-
rally follow suit. Thus, 11 labor 11 appears as "labour," 
"organization" appears as "organisation," and "program" 
appears as "programme," to cite three of the more common 
instances. 
Also, there is a problem of dating throughout the 
period in question, up to February, 1918. Prior to th~t 
date, Russia used the old style Julian Calendar which 
was thirteen days behind the Gregorian Calendar in the 
2cited hereinafter as: "Lenin, Works Vol. 
p. _. LCitation -of the original work will follow;7' 11 
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twentieth century, twelve days behind in the nineteenth 
century. On February 1, 1918, Russia adopted the stan-
dard Gregorian Calendar used throughout Western Europe 
and America. Thus, for most of the period covered in 
this study, two dates are commonly given for all events, 
a New Style date, abbreviated N.S., and an Old Style 
one, abbreviated o.s. Following common practice, this 
study will also date publications and events in both 
systems. ·In the footnotes the New Style date will al-
ways appear first, the Old Style date following in paren-
theses. In the text, the system used will always be 
indicated, and only one date will be given. The dif-
ference in dating, of course, explains why the Bolshevik 
Revolution is sometimes called the "October Revolution" 
and sometimes the "November Revolution," for it began 
'on October 24, o.s., and on November 6, N.S. 
Other than Lenin's works, the author consulted a 
number of the more important histories of the period in 
question. Such works, however, were generally not ger-
mane for this study, although they did provide excellent 
background material on the events about which Lenin 
wrote. The histories consulted may be found in the 
bibliography. 
Precis of Chapters 
Chapter II will be concerned with Lenin's concept 
of the necessity of persuasion. Orthodox Marxism would 
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lead to the belief in "spontaneous generation," the idea 
that economic development alone would cause the prole-
tariat to become a truly revolutionary class. Lenin re-
jected the theory of spontaneous generation, contending 
that the proletariat spontaneously would only seek to 
satisfy their petty day-to-day economic needs. The pro-
letariat, on its own, would never conclude that a com-
plete political change was needed to solve their real 
problems. Lenin argued that the intelligentsia would 
have to bring class consciousness to the proletariat, 
and the method they would have to use, of course, would 
be persuasion. Thus, he justified the necessity of 
persuasion as a revolutionary strategy. 
Chapter III will deal with the two central con-
cepts of persuasion: "agitation" and "propaganda." 
Both concepts had a significant history before Lenin 
contacted them and made them an integral part of his 
revolutionary theory. The concept of propaganda will be 
traced generally back through the nineteenth century. 
The concept of agitation will be traced back to its ori-
gin in Poland late in the nineteenth century. Lenin 
contacted these two concepts and altered them, finally 
defining them in 1902. "Agitation" he defined as per-
suasion designed for the masses, presenting one idea and 
illustrating it .. "Propaganda" he defined as persuasion 
for the intellectual elite, systematically presenting 
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many ideas as a theoretical whole. 
Agitation and propasanda will then be considered 
from the point of view of the tasks they were to per-
form. At the most general level, all persuasive attempts 
were to be educational in nature. Lenin always argued 
that the masses simply needed to be told the truth about 
classes and class interests and they would immediately 
adopt their correct class beliefs and act accordingly. 
Thus, agitation and propaganda were to educate the 
masses to become class conscious. 
Persuasion also had a number of specific tasks 
which will be considered: to increase support for the 
Party, disseminate socialistic ideas, propagate demo-
cratic ideas, and spread an understanding of the auto-
cratic government. 
On a number of occasions Lenin gave specific in-
structions to agitators which will also be discussed in 
Chapter III. Lenin advised the use of the spoken word 
for agitation, the written word for propaganda. He 
recommended adaptation to the audience in all cases and 
' 
in all ways necessary for maximum effectiveness. He 
believed repetition and the use of examples to be two of 
the most effective techniques. 
Chapter IV will deal with slogans. Lenin advocated 
the use of slogans as focal points for the content of 
all agitation and propaganda. The slogan, to be a cor-
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rect one, had to be obtained from a detailed analysis of 
the social forces active at the time. If the slogan 
were incorrect, it was labeled a "mere phrase," often 
the conscious product of 11phrasemongers, 11 who were bour-
geois in spirit and were therefore condemned. 
Chapter V will deal with two issues somewhat tan-
gential to the subject of persuasion. Organizational 
theories for the Social Democratic Party occupied much 
of Lenin's time and were crucial in his thought. His 
organizational concepts are relevant at several points 
to the topic of persuasion since he conceived of the 
Party as an organization designed to conduct agitation 
and propaganda in an autocratic state. Thus he advo-
cated a tightly organized, highly centralized Party 
limited in membership to professional revolutionaries. 
At several times Lenin discussed various media for 
persuasion, three of which will be considered in Chapter 
V. Lenin advocated the use of the Duma for best advan-
tage, including the opportunity to introduce bills: 
the Social Democratic Bills should be agitational in 
nature. Second, he advised comrades facing trial on how 
best to use the courtroom as an agitational forum. He 
advised them to expose the trial as a fraud, if possible, 
but under all circumstances to include a speech on Party 
principles. Finally, the Party newspaper received much 
attention. The newspaper was conceived as primarily an 
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intra-Party organ; any outside circulation would be 
incidental. The paper would provide organizational 
contacts for the Party, would aid in preserving ideo-
logical unity and purity, and would help develop new 
agitators, propagandists, and organizers. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NECESSITY OF PERSUASION 
As a Marxist, Lenin desired the eventual estab-
lishment of a communist society. However, in his writ-
ing he was more concerned with the immediate tasks on 
the road to that society than with the end resu~t. His 
orientation was almost always toward the problems of 
,the moment; he was more concerned with immediate tactics 
than with abstract concepts of the future. As a result, 
-he introduced several new concepts into Marxism and re-
arranged the emphasis to be placed on the original con-
cepts. One important revision was that, for Lenin, the 
\ 
class struggle had to come from outside the proletariat. 
As a revolutionary strategy persuasion was to play a 
role in arousing the proletariat to the class struggle. 
The role of persuasion seems to be a point at which 
Lenin introduced at least a difference in emphasis into 
Marxist theory, if not a complete innovation, for, as 
Bertrand Russell has stated, Marx expected little from 
persuasion. 1 
1Bertrand Russell, A Histo1 of Western Philosophy 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 45), P• 790. 
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In this chapter Lenin's basic concepts of the goal 
of persuasion will be presented. Such a presentation 
seems necessary to establish the role of persuasion as 
\ 
a revolutionary strategy since it does not appear to 
be intrinsic to pure Marxism. However, the role of per-
suasion will be discussed not as a revision of Marxism--
that is beyond the scope of this study--but simply as 
Lenin himself presented it. 
First, we must examine the goal Lenin desired to 
achieve as a revolutionary. His concern was how the 
class struggle could be won by the proletariat. Beyond 
this abstract goal of victory, Lenin seemed not to be 
concerned until he was actually presented with the con-
crete problems of government; until November, 1917 
~N.S.), he dealt almost entirely with revolution, not 
'with governing. Thus, successful revolution itself may 
be taken as Lenin's major goal. 
For the proletariat to win a victory in the class 
struggle, the first prerequisite was that the proletar-
iat be self-conscious, or, in Lenin's terms, develop 
class consciousness. Naturally, for consciousness of 
class interests to be developed, a definition of the 
term "class consciousness" was needed. Lenin seems to 
have arrived at such a definition quite early. In 1895 
or 1896, while in prison in St. Petersburg, he wrote an 
explanation of a program for the Social Democratic Party 
22 
in which the term "class consciousness 0 is explicitly 
defined: 
The workers' class-consciousness means the 
workers' understanding that the only way to 
improve their conditions and to achieve their 
emancipation is to conduct a struggle against 
the capitalist and factory-owner class created 
by the big factories. Further, the workers• 
class-consciousness means their understanding 
that the interests of all the workers of any 
particular country are identical, that they 
all constitute one class~ separate from all 
the other classes in society. Finally, the 
class-consciousness of the workers means the 
workers' understanding that to achieve their 
aims they have to work to influence affairs 
of state, just as the landlords and the cap2 italists did, and are continuing to do now~ 
In this early definition, class consciousness included 
three important characteristics: 1) realization of the 
I 
necessity of struggle against the bourgeoisie, 2) an 
outlook na'tional in scope, and 3) realization of the 
political aspect of the class struggle. Only the second 
characteristic was significantly altered in Lenin's 
later thought, in which an international outlook was to 
replace a national one. 
In 1902, in What Is To Be Done? Lenin expanded the 
concept of class consciousness: 
Working-class consciousness cannot be genuine 
political consciousness unless the workers are 
trained.to respond to all cases of tyranny, 
oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter 
what class is affected--unless they are trained, 
2Lenin, Works Vol. 2, pp. 112-13. "Explanation of 
the Programme for the Social-Democratic Party," written 
in 1895 or 1896, first published in 1924. 
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moreover, to respond from a Social-Democratic 
point of view and no other. The consciousness 
of the working masses cannot be genuine class-
consciousness, unless the workers learn, from 
concrete, and above all from topical, political 
facts and events to'observe every other social 
class in all the manifestations of its intellec-
tual, ethical, and political life; unless they 
learn to apply in practice the materialist 
analysis and the materialist estimate of all 
aspects of the life and activity of all classes, 
strata, and groups of the population~ 
In the expanded form, class consciousness included 
awareness of all aspects of life, not just economic as-
pects. Moreover, the emphasis is clearly placed on the 
political aspects; in fact, Lenin almost equated class 
consciousness with political consciousness. In actual 
practice, as will be seen when we come to the discussion 
of agitation and propaganda, Lenin changed his views 
drastically between 1896 and 1902. In 1896 he was pri-
marily concerned with the immediate economic aspects of 
the workers' lives. By 1902 he had broadened his out-
look to include the necessity, indeed, the predominance, 
of the political aspects of,the class struggle, and he 
included this broader outlook in his definition of 
class consciousness. 
Class consciousness, of course, was not to be taken 
as an end in itself. It was merely the prerequisite for 
waging class war, for carrying out in practice the theory 
3Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 412. What Is To Be Done?, 
March, 1902. Italics here and throughout the chapter 
are in the original. 
24 
of class struggleo Lenin seems to have arrived at a 
definition of 11 class struggle" fairly early. In exile, 
in 1899, he wrote: 
We are all agreed that our task is that 
of the organisation of the proletarian class 
struggle. But what is this class struggle? 
When the workers of a single factory or of a 
single branch of industry engage in struggle 
against their employer or employers, is this 
class struggle? No, this is only a weak em-
bryo of it. The struggle of the workers be-
comes a class struggle only when all the fore-
most representatives of the entire working 
class of the whole country are conscious of 
themselves as a single working class and launch 
a struggle that is directed, not against indi-
vidual employers, but against the entire class 
of capitalists and a~ainst the government that 
supports that class. 
For the moment, we must take this as a beginning, as a 
working definition he used at the beginning of his rev-
olutionary career. There is one curious idea included 
in it, which may become clearer as we progress through 
Lenin's concepts of persuasion. Note that the struggle 
of workers against employers becomes a class struggle 
only when the "foremost representatives" of the workers 
obtain something resembling the 1896 definition of 
class consciousness, i.e., they must realize the neces-
sity of struggle against the bourgeoisie, have an out-
look national in scope, and realize the political as-
pect of the class struggle. What about the rest of the 
4Lenin, Works Vol. 4, p. 215. Our Immediate 
Tasks, written in the last half of 18W, first published 
in 1925. 
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workers? Did they need class consciousness to make a 
class war out of a mere trade union struggle? If we go 
back to the definitions given in 1902 of the term "class 
consciousness" we will see an apparent change. In 1902, 
class consciousness referred to "the" workers, not 
11 some" workers or "foremost representatives" of the work-
ers. It would appear that Lenin's 1899 definition of 
"class struggle 11 may be a carry over from his days in 
St. Petersburg in 1894-1896, of which more later. After 
returning from exile, Lenin's works generally indicate 
whenever he used the term "foremost representatives of 
the working class" or a similar phrase, that he meant 
the proletariat as an entire class, as distinguished 
from, for example, the peasantse But the context in the 
case in question does not clarify the issue at all; 
indeed, it tends to confound it, as it appears that Lenin 
may have been referring to the Earty. At least it is 
clear that Lenin regarded class consciousness as a means 
to an end, i.e., as a method of converting strikes and 
individual or even industry-wide labor activity into a 
genuine class struggle. It also appears that Lenin 
developed at least a vague notion of what that class 
struggle would be quite early. His later concepts will 
be presented as we deal with the various aspects of per-
suasion. 
Before going further into an analysis of Lenin's 
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concept of the class struggle and the strategy of waging 
it, it must be pointed out that Lenin, consistent with 
orthodox Marxist analysis, was directly concerned only 
with the proletariat, i.e., the industrial workers. 
They were, he believed, the only truly revolutionary 
class. In this belief, Lenin seems to have been quite 
consistent even from his early, pre-exile years to later 
periods in his career. In 1894, in his first major 
polemical work, What the 11Friends of the People" Are and 
How They Fight the Social-Democrats he wrote: 
/.Jhi/ position of the factory worker in the 
general system of capitalist relations makes 
him the sole fighter for the emancipation of 
the working class, for only the higher stage 
of development of capitalism, large-scale ma-
chine industry, creates the material condi-
tions and5the social forces necessary for this struggle. 
In 1897, while in exile, he wrote The Tasks .Q! the Rus-
sian Social-Democrats: 
••• in the fight against the autocracy, the 
working class must single itself out, for it 
is the only thoroughly consistent and unre-
served enemy of the autocracy, only between 
the working class and the autocracy is no 
compromise possible, only in the working class 
can democracy find a champion who makes no 
reservations, is not irresolute and does not 
look back. The hostility of all other classes, 
groups and strata of the population towards 
5Lenin, Works Vol. 1, pp. 299-300. What the 
"Friends of the People 11 ~~How They Fight the §2-
cial-Democrats, 1894. 
27 
the autocracy is not unqualified; their demo-
cracy always looks back.6 
The context of the above quotation clearly limits the 
meaning of the term nworking classn to the proletariat. 
And, in 1909, he approved a resolution of the Bolsheviks 
which stated: 
Only the proletariat can bring the democratic 
revolution to its consummation, the condition 
being that the proletariat, as the only thor-
oughly revolutionary class in modern society, 
leads the mass of the peasantry, and imparts 
political consciousness to its spontaneous 
struggle against landed ~roprietorship and 
the feudal state ••• ."I 
Note that in all three quotations Lenin pointed to the 
proletariat as the only class with which he was directly 
and immediately concerned. Thus, in his theory of per-
suasion as a revolutionary strategy, he was concerned 
with the proletariat as the primary intended receivers 
of the persuasive messages. 
Having examined Lenin's definitions of the con-
cepts of class consciousness and the class struggle, yet 
another term comes to the fore: "spontaneous genera-
tion." It was Lenin's rejection of the theory of spon-
taneous generation that led him to his theory of per-
6Lenin, Works Vol. 2, p. 335. The Tasks of the 
Russian Social-Democrats, written at the end ofl8W, 
first published in Geneva in 1898. 
?Lenin, Works Vol. 15, p. 362. "The Aim of the 
Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution," Sotsial-Demo-
krat, No. 3, March 22 (9), 1909. -
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suasion as a revolutionary strategy. The theory of 
spontaneous generation was a pure Marxist concept, con-
tending that the working class, if left on its own, would 
spontaneously take part in the class struggle against 
the bourgeoisie. It held that no outside forces were 
needed, that mere economic development alone would auto-
matically lead to the development of the proletariat as 
a revolutionary class. Lenin seems to have opposed the 
theory of spontaneous generation at least as early as 
his period of exile. In 1899, in an article entitled 
11 Apropos of the Profession de Foi, 11 he took issue with 
spontaneity: 
Can one find in history a single case of a pop-
ular movement, of a class movement, that did 
not begin with spontaneous, unorganised out-
bursts, that would have assumed an organised 
form and created political parties without the 
conscious intervention of enlightened repre-
sentatives of the given class? If the working-
class urge, spontaneous and indomitable, to 
engage in political struggle has so far taken 
mainly the form of unorganised outbursts, only 
Moskovskiye Vedomosti and Grazhdanin ffiwo mon-
archist journal.@/ can draw from this the con-
clusion that the Russian workers have not yet, 
in the mass, attained the maturity for polit-
ical agit~tion. A socialist, on the contrary, 
will draw from it the conclusion that the time 
has long been ripe for political agitation.~ 
Lenin believed that "spontaneously 11 the working class 
would develop only trade union consciousness, not class 
8Lenin, Works Vol. 4, p. 290. "Apropos 0£ the 
Profession de Foi, 11 written at the end of 1899, first 
published in 1924. 
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consciousness for the class struggle. All that the 
working class would achieve on their own would be a very 
primitive form of outbursts against individual employ-
ers or, at best, individual industries, designed to win 
concession to their simple, petty demands; no true an-
tagonism against the bourgeoisie as a class would develop. 
Lenin's views on spontaneity were more fully de-
veloped by 1902. He explained his position in What Is 
To Be Done?: -----
There is much talk of spontaneity. But the 
spontaneous development of the working-
class movement leads to its subordination to 
bourgeois ideology, to its development along 
the lines of the Credo programme; for the 
spontaneous working-class movement is trade-
unionism, is Nur-Gewerkschaftlerei, and trade-
unionism meansthe ideological enslavement of 
the workers by the bourgeoisie. Hence, our 
task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to com-
bat spontaneity, to divert.the working-class 
movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist 
striving to come under the wing of the bour-
geoisie, and to bring it under the wing of 
revolutionary Social-Democracy •••• 
But why, the reader will ask, does the 
spontaneous movement, the movement along the 
line of least resistance, lead to the domina-
tion of bourgeois ideology? For the simple 
reason that bourgeois ideology is far older in 
origin than socialist ideology, that it is more 
fully developed, and that it has at its dis-
posal immeasurably more means of dissemination. 
And the younger the socialist movement in any 
given country, the more vigorously it must 
struggle against all attempts to entrench non-
socialist ideology, and the more resolutely the 
workers must be warned against the bad coun-
sellors who shout against "overrating the con-
scious element," etc. • • • 
u • o • • • • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
It is often said that the working class 
spontaneously gravitates towards socialism. 
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This is perfectly true in the sense that social-
ist theory reveals the causes of the misery of 
the working class more profoundly and more cor-
rectly than any other theory, and .for that rea-
son the workers are able to assimilate it so 
easily, provided, however, this theory does not 
itself yield to spontaneity, provided it sub-
ordinates spontaneity to itself. Usually this 
is taken for granted, but it is precisely this 
which Rabocheye Dyelo I.fa political Journal which 
advocated the "Economist" heresyl .forgets or dis-
torts. The working class spontaneously gravi-
tates towards socialism; nevertheless, most wide-
spread (and continuously and diversely revived) 
bourgeois ideology spontaneously imposes itself 
upon the working class to a still greater de-
gree. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • 
Rabochaya Mysl Lanother Economist journaJ7 be-
lieves, however, that "politics always obedi-
ently .follows economics" (Rabocheye Dyelo 
varies this thesis when it asserts in its pro-
gramme that 11 in Russia more than in any other 
country, the economic struggle is inseparable 
.from the political struggle 11 ). I.f politics 
is meant Social-Democratic politics, then the 
theses of Rabochaya Mysl and Rabocheye Dyelo 
are utterly incorrect. The economic struggle 
of the workers is very o.ften connected (although 
not inseparably) with bourgeois politics, cler-
ical politics, etc., as we have seen. Rabocheye 
Dyelo's theses are correct, if by politics is 
meant trade-union politics, viz., the common 
striving of all workers to secure .from the gov-
ernment measures for alleviating the distress 
to which their condition gives rise, but which 
do not abolish that condition, i.e., which do 9 not remove the subjection of labour to capital. 
Thus, by 1902, Lenin had come to the position that 
spontaneity was something to be combatted by all good 
Social Democrats. Notice, of course, that this position 
9Lenin, Works Vol. 5, pp. 384-87. 
Done?, March, 1902. 
What Is To Be ---------
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was adopted for the purpose of refutation. 10 The Credo 
program was a document which favored the idea of spon-
taneity, of letting the workers develop their own class 
consciousness. It was an example of the heresy of 
"Economism," which Lenin often labeled, "Tail-ism." 
However, it is important to note his position that the 
workers could not on their own develop anything but 
bourgeois trade union consciousness. This meant that 
the socialists, those who were to lead the workers in 
the class struggle, had two tasks: 1) they had to lead 
the workers rather than merely follow them or join 
them, and 2) they had to lead from the outside, i.eo, 
they must be revolutionaries, intellectuals, outside 
the working class, since class consciousness could only 
be brought to the proletariat from outside. Here is 
where persuasion began to play a role as a revolution-
ary strategy. 
To understand Lenin's position, we should look 
briefly at the application of his concept of spontaneous 
generation. He used the examples of the famous strikes 
of the late nineteenth century to illustrate and prove 
his point. The strikes which broke out in the 1860's 
10some doubt is cast on the above analysis by 
Baron, who claimed that Lenin "conceded that he had over-
stated the case for consciousness as a corrective to the 
deplorable predilection of the Economists for sponta-
neity." Samuel Baron, Plekhanov (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 236. 
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and 1870's, he claimed'I were "spontaneous" and were 
accompanied by the "spontaneous" destruction of plant 
equipment and machinery. These he labeled "revolts." 
He then compared them with the strikes which occurred 
in the 1890's, which were much more highly organized 
and had more clearly defined objectives. The strikes of 
the 1890's, he believed, might even be called "con-
scious" because of the progress which they showed the 
working class had made since the earlier period of 
"revolts. 11 However, even though the last group of 
strikes might be labeled "conscious 11 they still proved 
that the spontaneously developed element represented 
nothing more than "consciousness" in an "embryonic 
form." The early "revolts" Lenin characterized as being 
simply the "resistance of the oppressed" whereas the 
later series were systematic, representing the class 
struggle in embryo, "but only in embryo." By them-
selves, these systematic strikes were only trade union 
struggles, not Social Democratic struggles. Here, as 
elsewhere, Lenin seems to have equated "Social Demo-
cratic struggles 11 with the true "class struggle. 11 Even 
as late as the 1890's, he contended, the workers still 
had not, indeed could not have, developed true class 
consciousness. 11 
11Lenin, Works Vol. 5, PP• 374-75. 
Be Done?, March, 1902. 
What Is To ---
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Lenin believed that true class consciousness would 
necessarily come from outside the working class. He 
developed and explained this idea in What Is To Be 
Done?: 
We have said that there could not have 
been Social-Democratic consciousnessEUnong the 
workers& It would have to be brought to them 
from without. The history of all countries 
shows that the working class, exclusively by 
its own effort, is able to develop only trade-
union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that 
it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the 
employers, and strive to compel the government 
to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.12 
All those who talk about uoverrating the im-
portance of ideology 11 , about exaggerating the 
role of the conscious element, etc., imagine 
that the labour movement pure and simple can 
elaborate, and will elaborate, an independent 
ideology for itself, if only the workers 
nwrest their fate from the hands of the lead-
ers". But this is a profound mistake •••• 
• • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • there can be no talk of an independent 
ideology formulated by the working masses them-
selves in the process of their movement, the 
only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist 
ideology. There is no middle ground (for man-
kind has not created a "third" ideology, and, 
moreover, in a society torn by class antago-
nisms there can never be a non-class or an 
above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle 
th~ sociali~t ~deology in any way, to turn 
aside from it~ the slightest de~ree means 
to strengthen bourgeois ideology. 3 
Lenin found considerable support for his argument 
by looking at the history of the socialist movement. 
He found, of course, that the founders of nmodern scien-
12Ibid., p. 375. 
13Ibid., pp. 383-84. 
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tific socialism," Marx and Engels, belonged to the "bour-
geois intelligentsia." In Russia, the Social Democratic 
doctrine and theory was developed completely independ-
ently of the nspontaneous growth of the working-class 
movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome 
of the development of thought among the revolutionary 
socialist intelligentsia. 1114 
When discussing Economism, a heresy which advo-
cated limitation of agitation and propaganda to purely 
economic issues, Lenin advanced a slightly different 
analysis to demonstrate that proletarian class conscious-
ness must come from without. He claimed that class 
political consciousness must be brought to the workers 
from the outside, "that is, only from outside the eco-
nomic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations 
between workers and employers." Political conscious-
ness must be brought from the.sphere of politics, that 
is, from the "sphere of relationships of all classes 
and strata to the state and the government, the sphere 
of the interrelations between all classes." Lenin con-
cluded this discussion by contending that, to bring 
poli ticnl c onociouon0130 to l;he world nr; cloos, the Social 
Democrats would have to go among all classes of the 
population, presumably to find out what the relation-
14Ibid., pp. 375-76. 
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ships of all the classes actually were. 15 
Having decided that the workers could only obtain 
class political consciousness, which was the same as 
Social Democratic consciousness, if it were brought to 
them from outside their own sphere, Lenin naturally was 
faced with the question: How should political conscious-
ness be brought to the workers? He believed that a van-
guard party of revolutionaries, existing independently 
of the working class, was the proper tool to use to 
bring political knowledge to the workers. A preliminary 
form of this idea may be discerned as early as 1899 in 
his "Apropos of the Profession de Foi": 
In no political or social movement, in no 
country has there ever been, or could there 
ever have been, any other relation between 
the masses of the given class or people and 
its numerically few educated representatives 
than the following: everywhere and at all 
times the leaders of a certain class have al-
ways been its advanced, most cultivated rep-
resentatives. Nor can there be any other 
situation in the Russian working-class move-
ment.16 
In Russia, as elsewhere, these advanced representatives 
were naturally to be the Social Democratic Party. It 
was the Party that would instill political conscious-
ness and the persuasive methods to be used were "agita-
15Ibid., p. 422. 
16Lenin, Works Vol .. 4, p. 292. "Apropos of the 
Profession de Foi, 11 written at the end of 1899, first 
published in 19240 
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tion" and "propaganda. 11 
In this chapter we have seen why Lenin believed 
persuasion necessary for the revolution. He did not 
believe that the development of the economy itself would 
induce a revolutionary attitude in the proletariat. 
Economic development alone would leave the proletariat 
concerned solely with immediate economic issues, it 
could only lead to the development of trade union con-
sciousness. Persuasion was needed, he thought, to 
develop the class political consciousness of the workers, 
to get them to advance the class struggle at the polit-
ical level. 
CHAPTER III 
AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA 
This study is concerned primarily with Lenin's 
theories of persuasion as a revolutionary strategy after 
i 
1902, the year in which the all-important What Is To Be 
Done? was written. It was this book that laid the foun-
dations for Bolshevism. It was this book that formed 
the basis for a distinction between European Social 
Democracy and the Russian Bolshevik faction, or partye 
It was this book that laid the foundations for the split 
in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, in 1903, 
· between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. However, 
although What Is To Be Done? is the basis for much of 
this study, it would be profitable to discover the ori-
gins of the two central concepts of Lenin's theory, 
"agitation" and "propaganda," as they relate to Lenin 
and to Russia. 
Agitation and Propa5anda: Definitions 
To analyze the origins of the concepts of agi-
tation and propaganda, we may rely heavily on Richard 
Pipes' short but extensively documented study, Social 
Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement: 1885-
37 
38 
1897. Pipes selected St. Petersburg as the center for 
his attention for two reasons. First, he claimed, St. 
Petersburg was both the educational capital of the coun-
try and the locale of its most,advanced industries. As 
such, it attracted the ablest of Russian labor leaders. 
Second, the future leaders of both factions of Russian 
Social Democracy received their training in labor or-
ganizations there: Martov, Dan, Potresov, Lenin and 
several others. 1 Having selected St. Petersburg, Pipes 
presented a brief history of the various labor groups 
there. It is a story of organization followed by ar-
rests, of workers distrustful of intellectuals, of intel-
lectuals attempting to influence workers for political 
gain. 
First we must analyze an institution which arose 
in late nineteenth century Russia, the worker circle. 
The worker circle was the principal institutional ex-
pression of the emergence of the labor intelligentsia. 
These circles usually came into existence on the initi-
ative of a worker who was attending evening or Sunday 
school. The worker-student would usually suggest to 
other students that they meet periodically to discuss 
serious books. 2 These worker circles were first used 
1Richard Pipes, Social Democracy and the St. 
burg Labor Movement, 188~-1§22 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
vard University Press, 1 63)----;-p. x~ 




for political purposes by the Populist parties. Pipes 
contended that almost all of the activities taken up by 
the Social Democrats--formation of labor circles, prop-
aganda, strike agitation, the printing of leaflets and 
pamphlets for workers--had first been devised and prac-
tised by the Populists. The Social Democrats merely 
"cultivated soil which had been turned and seeded by 
their Populist predecessors. 113 Alexander Kerensky, 
later to become Minister of Justice and then Prime Min-
ister in the Provisional Government, has ~elated approx-
imately the same course of events. Kerensky stated that 
the revolutionary work among the peasants during the 
1870's failed because the peasants obtained the right 
to free labor on their own land. Thus, the peasants 
were faced with the task of building up their own inde-
pendent economy, which would take all of their strength 
and attention. After 1881 the revolutionaries realized 
that the peasants would be occupied with their own eco-
nomic affairs, rather than with political struggles, for 
a long time, so they looked around for another group 
with which to work. The reign of Alexander III saw t~e 
formation of the proletariat as an independent class 
and an independent political force. Consequently, the 
revolutionary youth turned their attention to the indus-
3Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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trial workers. Naturally, these revolutionaries were 
at first the old Populists who had originally worked 
with the peasants.4 
The intellectuals, the revolutionary youth, at-
tempted to use the worker circles to spread their polit-
ical doctrines. It should be noted that the worker 
circles at first were composed strictly of workers. 
They were formed on the initiative of the workers; the 
intellectuals played no role in their formation or their 
composition. However, the intellectuals were a contact 
with the outside world which these circles sought. For 
this reason, the circles usually allowed intellectuals 
to "visit 11 them, wi-chout regard to their political be-
liefs; yet, the circles sought to maintain strict inde-
pendence from these visitors. In fact, such visitors 
were not unqualifiedly welcome. Pipes ascribed a basic 
distrust of the intellectuals to a divergence of inter-
estse The workers wanted to learn in order to escape 
the "monotonous and hopeless condition of the factory" 
and to obtain a respectable place in societyu The in-
tellectuals, on the other hand, sought contact with the 
workers as a means of bringing socialist ideas to the 
working class. Added to this divergence of interests 
was the realization, certainly rapid, that contact with 
4Alexander Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty 
(New York: The John Day Company, 1934), ppQ 48-49. 
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intellectuals led to police surveillance and often to 
arrests. Finally, Pipes stated, psychological factors 
played a role in the workers' distrust of the intellec-
tuals. The intellectuals were usually students at either 
the University or the Technological Institute in St. 
Petersburg. They were young, but of approximately the 
same age as the members of the worker circles. However, 
the students had rarely worked, were naive and bookish, 
whereas the workers usually had begun earning a living 
when very young, often while still in their early 
teens. They were, as a result, more mature than the 
students. Add to this the fact that, as June arrived 
each year, the students left for home while the workers 
had to stay and continue earning a living. 5 All in all, 
the two groups--the workers and the intellectual, rev-
olutionary youth--were quite different. 
As previously mentioned, the Populists began the 
work with the proletariat and the Social Democrats later 
took up their own contacts. However, at this early 
date, it was very difficult to distinguish the Populists 
from the Social Democrats, at least within the boundaries 
of Russia. This condition prevailed in varying degrees 
throughout the entire period in question--up until the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The emigres abroad car-
5p• ·t 10 11 ipes, .2:2_. £1_., PP• - • 
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ried on polemics among themselves, but inside Russia, 
the various parties often worked fairly well together. 
However, there appears to have been a distinguishing 
difference between the two groups in the area of tac-
tics. The Social Democrats viewed the educational op-
portunities of contacts with worker circles as a long-
range proposition, a chance to develop the class con-
sciousness of the workers. The long-range, educational 
approach would become known as 11 propaganda. 11 The Popu-
lists, on the other hand, were more interested in 
stirring up the workers to immediate action--to strike, 
primarily, but sometimes even to undertake terrorist 
activities. The tactics used would become known as 
11 agitation. 116 
Because of the difference in tactics, the workers 
came to prefer contact with the Social Democrats: it 
was safer than contact with the Populists. This was 
the conclusion reached by the czarist police in a report 
prepared in 1896 on the basis of extensive interrogation 
of both workers and intellectuals arrested in connection 
with one of the revolutionary groups, the Union of 
Struggle.7 Their conclusion is quite understandable, 
if we remember that the workers were primarily interested 
6Ibid., p. 14. 
7Ibid., p. 15. 
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in the intellectuals because of the education which 
could be received from them, not because of the action 
they, the workers, could perform as agents of the rev-
olutionaries. 
During the late 1880's the intellectuals, the 
students in St. Petersburg, worked with worker circles 
on an individual, independent basis. At the end of 
that decade, however, they began to organize themselves 
for greater effectiveness. In 1889 the Social Democrats 
became the first group to organize. In that year stu-
dents, primarily from the Technological Institute, 
united to conduct propaganda among industrial workers 
and to train cadres of propagandists from the ranks of 
the working class. 8 For a period of several years the 
workers' organizations and the intellectuals' groups 
worked independently of each other. There were con-
tacts, to be sure, but the initiative still came from 
the workers who still viewed the students as at best 
suspect. However, contacts improved during this per-
iod. 
The Social Democrats, holding as their goal the 
independence of the workers, were remarkably success-
ful. By the summer of 1891 the Central Worker Circle, 
the major one in St. Petersburg, was able to function 
8Ibid., p. 25. 
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entirely on its own 9 training its own instructors to 
provide to the various lesser circles. It even widened 
its activity to cover areas outside the capital city. 9 
But the very next year~ 1892, following an abortive at-
tempt to hold a May Day celebration, the police arrested 
almost all of the leaders of the Central Worker Circle.10 
Reorganization began the following year, 1893, 
under much the same arrangements as before. However, 
this time the Social Democrats were led by I. Radchenko, 
who laid the foundation for much of the later Social 
Democratic attitude toward the workers. It was Rad-
chenko's group that Lenin was soon to join. Radchenko 
rejected the principle of labor hegemony which had pre-
viously determined all relationships between workers and 
intellectuals. He did not believe that the workers 
could take care of themselves. He thought they were 
incapable of protecting themselves from police, from 
squandering their energy on trivial matters, and were 
totally incapable of organizing on their own for the 
struggle against the autocratic regime. Radchenko be-
lieved that all propaganda activities should be placed 
in the hands of a small conspiratorial organization of 
revolutionaries. 11 These views were almost identical 
gibid., pp. 35-36. 
lOibid., p. 38. 
11Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
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to those Lenin was to adopt nearly a decade later, with 
the single exception that Radchenko was solely concerned 
with propaganda, whereas Lenin in the twentieth century 
was also concerned with agitation. Radchenko's beliefs 
were basically a reversion to the old Populist concepts 
of relations with workers. 
In 1894 Lenin came to St. Petersburg to practice 
law and to join the revolutionaries. From the very 
beginning, he was far more interested in literary and 
theoretical activities than in practical, routine propa-
gandistic or agitational activities. In fact, during 
his first year in St. Petersburg, Lenin had virtually no, 
direct contact with any workers. 12 Although Radchenko 
had started the Social Democnatic group on some half-
hearted propagandistic activity, he had made little more 
in the way of progress. Lenin did not attempt to re-
vitalize the group at all. Instead, he began work on 
polemical essays directed against the Populists, the 
first major one being, as Pipes translated the title, 
What Are the "Friends of the People 11 and How Do They 
Wage.War 2n the Social Democrats?1 3 
Although Lenin seems to have had little, if any-
thing, to do with it, the Social Democrats at this time 
instituted a change in tactics. It was at this point, 
12Ibi·d., 53 54 PP• - • 
13Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
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the mid-1890's, that the tactic known as agitation first 
came into use in Russia. 
This new method originated in Russian 
Poland, in a socialist labor organization 
called the Union of Polish Workers •••• 
Founded in 1889 by workers and intellectuals 
dissatisfied with the terrorist tactics of 
the ProletarJat group, the Union concentrated 
on economic conflicts between employers and 
workers on the assumption that the best way 
to create a mass organization and to interest 
the worker in politics is to promote indus-
trial strife. The exponents of this device 
maintained that the worker who was indiffer-
ent or hostile to socialist and democratic 
ideas instinctively understood his own needs 
and would respond favorably to propaganda 
based on his personal economic interests. A 
strike for higher wages or shorter working 
hours would soon drive him also to anti-
government activity because the government 
would back the employers and punish the 
strikers, thus revealing the intimate con-
nection between the capitalist system and 
the country's political regime. The worker 
would come to understand that he could not im-
prove his lot without fighting autocracy. 
Thus the goal of political action in the 
name of democracy and socialism would be 
reached by way of the economic struggle in 
the name of the worker's immediate needs. 
This tactic called for agitation among the 
mass of industrial laborers, that is, incite-
ment against their employers and the author-
ities who were expected to support them.14 
It should be noted that, although the end goal of agi-
tation was political, the day-to-day agitation ignored 
political issues. Agitation, as conceived by the Union 
of Polish Workers, dealt strictly with economic goals, 
and immediate economic goals at that. The political 
ends, the Union believed, would come with time. This, 
14Ibid., p. 58. 
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as we shall see, Lenin changed completely. But Lenin's 
revision was to come nearly a decade later; at this 
point he was little concerned with the subject of agi-
tation. 
From the Union of Polish Workers, the tactic of 
agitation reached Russia by way of Vilno on the Lithu-
anian borderlands. Pipes stated that the Jewish Social 
Democrats in Vilno modeled themselves on the Poles and 
organized strike funds among the local workers. They 
also instigated a number of strikes, primarily to reduce 
working hours. 15 Seton-Watson also recorded Vilna, as 
he transliterated the name, as a center of Marxist 
activities. He, too, concluded that there the distinc-
tion was made between agitation and propaganda as 
tactics. 16 However, apparently even at Vilna (or Vilno) 
the workers were not very friendly toward the Social 
Democratic intellectuals. They seem to have been es-
pecially hostile to the new method of agitation, and 
for the same reasons that the Russian workers opposed 
the Populists' tactics of terror. To gain the workers' 
acceptance of the agitational technique, in 1896 Alex-
ander Kremer wrote a pamphlet called Ob-agitatsii or On 
Agitation. Edited by Martov, it was to spread through-
15Ibid. , p. 60 .. 
1611ugh Soton-Wn toon, 'rhe Doc lino of Imperial Hus-
sia, ~-1914 (New York: ~•rederick A.Praeger, n.cf:;, 
p. 14 7. 
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out Russia, soon acquiring the status of a handbook of 
Social Democratic action. 17 This pamphlet seems to be 
the form in which Lenin was introduced to the new method. 
It characterized agitation precisely as the Union of 
Polish Workers had used it. Pipes translated a signifi-
cant passage from On Agitation as follows: 
••• no matter how extensive the labor move-
ment, its successes cannot be assured until 
labor commits itself firmly to the political 
struggle. The attainment of political power 
represents the main task of the struggling 
proletariat. But this task can confront the 
worker only when the economic struggle demon-
strates to him that it is clearly impossible 
to improve his lot under existing political 
conditions. Only when the strivings of the 
proletariat come to confront directly the 
given political system, and when the current 
of the labor movement comes up against politi-
cal authority, will the movement have arrived 
at the phase at which the class struggle is 
transformed into a conscious political struggle • 
• • • the task of Social Democrats lies in 
carrying out continuous agitation among fac-
tory workers on the basis of their everyday 
petty needs and demands.18 
In practice, agitation was carried out during this 
early period in a series of set steps. First, with the 
aid of friendly workers, usually members of a worker 
circle, the Social Democrats would gather detailed 
information on the conditions and grievances of the 
workers at a certain factory. This information was then 
17Pipes, .212.· cit., p. 62. 
18Ibid., pp. 62-63. See also Baron, .9E.• ,ill., 
P• 149. 
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edited and written up as leaflets or proclamations 
addressed to the workers. The publications dealt with 
concrete issues which even the most simple minded wor-
ker could understand, such as wages, working hours, 
treatment by management, and the like. The publications 
concluded with discussions of relevant laws and prac-
tices followed in other similar factories. Finally 
the demands which the workers should make of management 
were presented. 19 
Agitation as a method reached St. Petersburg, and 
thus reached Lenin, by several routes. Martov brought 
in one copy of On Agitation in October, 1894. Silvin, 
another revolutionary, obtained a copy in Moscow and 
brought it to St. Petersburg. The Radchenko group, of 
which Lenin was a member, studied the document carefully 
and discussed it at great length. 20 The discussions of 
the new method revealed a split among the St. Peters-
burg intellectuals, a split which would continue in more 
or less the same manner for the entire period in ques-
tion, until the Bolsheviks finally won power in 1917. 
Radchenko and Krasin, another famous revolutionary, were 
completely opposed to the new method. They feared that 
it would deflect the attention of the Social Democrats 
away from their long-range goals, lead to concentration 
19Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
20Ibid., p. 64. 
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on trivial matters, and expose the revolutionaries to 
the police. 21 
More important, it seems that Lenin himself op-
posed agitation at first. The Social Democrats held 
one and possibly two meetings in the fall of 1894 to 
discuss the new method. 
Lenin's opposition to agitation is explicitly 
stated by E. Korolchuk •••• She asserts 
that at the meeting of Social Democratic 
intellectuals ••• held on February 18-
19, 1895, Lenin denounced this method of 
work and expressed preference for the older 
propagandistic tactic. Further evidence 
to this effect is provided by Lenin's first 
proclamation addressed to industrial ~~rkers 
wri~ten early in January 1895 •••• 
In January and February of 1895 strikes broke out in 
the Neva Mechanical and Naval Works and the New Admi-
, ralty. Lenin wrote two proclamations for the workers, 
following generally the same series of steps discussed 
earlier. The first proclamation, however, was described 
by Nikolaevasky as propagandistic rather than agitational 
in nature., The second was characterized by its "legal" 
appeal. It urged the workers not to revolt but to take 
advantage of the rights they possessed under existing 
legislation. 23 This seems consistent with the Lenin of 
the 1890's, but it is certainly different from the views 
21Ibid., PP• 64-65. 
22Ib id. , p. 65. 
23Ibid. , p. 66. 
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he expressed from 1902 on. 
Lenin was still far more interested in literary 
work than in the day-to-day routine of practical rev-
olutionary work. He Joined the organization of intel-
lectuals at the University and at the Free Economic 
Society which, under the leadership of Peter Struve, was 
challenging the Populist ideology. 24 In this organi~a-
tion, known as the stariki, Lenin was assigned to the 
job of editor-in-chief of the group's proposed publica-
tions: again, a literary job. 25 As editor-in-chief, 
however, he did write a few leaflets. One was the ap-
peal, 11 To the Workers of the Thornton Factory," which 
dealt exclusively with economic issues, making no al-
lusion to politics whatsoever. Also, he wrote the pam-
phlet in a very conciliatory tone, emphasizing the rights 
of the workers. In other words, it was a strictly le-
galistic appeal, merely asking the workers to stand up 
for the rights they already by law possessed. 26 The 




January of 1896, while attempting to distribute 
the first edition of their new newspaper, almost the 
entire membership of the stariki and many of the labor 
24 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
25Ibid., p. 86. 
26Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
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leaders as well were arrested. Lenin, too, was arrested 
and was eventually sentenced to three years exile in 
Siberia. This arrest confirmed the belief of the few 
remaining labor leaders that contact with the intellec-
tuals brought nothing but trouble; it reaffirmed their 
old skepticism about agitation as a tactic. 27 However, 
only a few short months later, in May of 1896, the St. 
Petersburg mass labor movement began. In that month 
the largest strike in Russian history up to that time 
took place among the textile workers. It was also the 
first strike in Russia to transcend the boundaries of 
an individual factory by spreading over the entire 
industry. It was followed by another strike of textile 
workers in January, 1897. Both of these strikes were 
worker-initiated, worker-led, and worker-directed. 28 
After the May textile strike had begun, Lenin, 
while still in prison awaiting sentence, agreed to draft 
a program for the striking workers. Edmund Wilson 
described Lenin writing the draft in the prison, using 
milk as invisible ink, and inkstands molded from bread 
so that they could be swallowed whenever the guard came 
around. 29 The draft program was smuggled out of the 
27Ibid., p. 98. 
28Ibid., p. 99. 
29Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Compan'y;-1940), p. 380. 
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jail and lost, but was recovered after the revolution. 
Pipes translated a portion of the draft: 
The Russian Social Democratic party declares 
as its task to help this struggle of the Rus-
sian working class by developing labor's 
class-consciousness, assisting its organiza-
tion, and showing it the real goals of the 
struggle •• o The task of the party is not 
to invent in its head some fashionable meth-
ods of helping the workers, but to join the 
labor movement, to illuminate it, to help 
the workers in the struggle which they have 
already begun to wage themselves.30 
The whole tone of this program was quite different from 
the tone Lenin was to use later. Note that the party 
was to help, not to lead, labor. The draft continued to 
discuss the economic struggle which in the first place 
supposedly demonstrated to the worker the nature of 
economic exploitation, in the second place imbued him 
with a fighting spirit~ and in the third place developed 
his political consciousness. Pipes contrasted this with 
the central theme of What Is To Be Done?, in which the 
thesis was that 11 class political consciousness can be 
brought to the worker only from the outside, that is, 
outside the economic struggle, outside the realm of 
relations of workers toward their employers. 11 31 Appar-
ently, Lenin changed his entire philosophy of tactics 
during his period of exile. 
3oPipes, £Q.o cit.? p. 109. Italics here and 
throughout the chapter are in the original. 
31Ibid., p. 110. 
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Lenin, as mentioned previously, das sentenced to 
three years 9 exile in Siberia in 1897~ He returned, 
after serving his term, in 1900 and rocumed his revo-
lutionary work. Soon after returning :ie wrote one of 
his most famous works, What Is To Be Done?, which was 
to be the basis for all the rest of his theoretical 
work as well as the basis for the Bolshevik faction of 
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Since his 
period of exile was primarily a period of study for 
Lenin rather than a period of writing or a period of 
action, we must jump a space of five years to find the 
concepts of agitation and propaganda in their final 
form. During the period of exile Lenin did, of course, 
write one of his major works, The Development of Capi-
talism in Russia, but that work is mainly a statistical 
analysis of the economy of Russia and as such does not 
concern us here. But he also wrote a few articles in 
which the development of his thought may be traced. 
In 1897, in Siberia, Lenin wrote The Tasks of~ 
Russian Social-Democrats, first published the following 
year in Geneva, in which he drew the distinction be-
tween these two terms, "agitation11 and "propaganda 0 : 
The socialist activities of Russian Social-
Democrats consist in spreading l?.x propaganda 
the teachings of scientific socialism, in 
spreading among the workers a proper under-
standing of the present social and economic 
system, its basis and its development, an 
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understanding of the various classes in 
Russian society, of their interrelations, 
of the struggle between these classes, of 
the role of tne working class in this strug-
gle, of its attitude towards the declining 
and the developing classes, towards the past 
and the future of capitalism, an understand-
ing of the historical task of international 
Social-Democracy and of the Russian working 
classo Inseparably connected with propaganda 
is agitation among the workers, which natural-
ly comes to the forefront in the present pol-
itical conditions of Russia and at the present 
level of development of the masses of workers. 
Agitation among the workers means that the 
Social-Democrats take part in all the spon-
taneous manifestations of the working-class 
struggle, in all the conflicts between the 
workers and the capitalists over the working 
day, wages, working conditions, etc., etc. 
Our task is to merge our activities with 
the practical, everyday questions of work-
ing-class life, to help the workers under-
stand these questions, to draw the workers• 
attention to the most important abuses, to 
help them formulate their demands to the em-
ployers more precisely and practically, to 
develop among the workers consciousness of 
their solidarity, consciousness of the com-
mon interests and common cause of all the 
Russian workers as a united working class 
that is part of the international army of 
the proletariat. To organise study circles 
among workers, to establish proper and sec-
ret connections between them and the central 
group of Social-Democrats, to publish and 
distribute working-class literature, to 
organise the receipt of correspondence from 
all centres of the working-class movement, 
to publish agitational leaflets and mani-
festos and to distribute them, and to train 
a body of experienced agitators--such, in 
broad outline, are the manifestations of 
the socialist activities of Russian Social-
Democracy.32 
32Lenin, Works Vol. 2, pp. 329-30. The Tasks of 
the Russian Social-Democrats, written at the end of 
1897, published in Geneva in 1898. 
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At this early date Lenin had not formulated the simple, 
precise distinction between these two terms that he 
arrived at later. The distinction between agitation 
and propaganda seems to hinge on the content of the 
message being delivered: agitation apparently was to 
deal with immediate economic issues, propaganda with 
broader economic and political ideas. This distinction 
Lenin was later not only to dismiss but to vigorously 
oppose: agitation limited to economic issues became 
the heresy of 11Economism 11 or "Tail-ism," the latter 
label derived from a statement by Plekhanov who con-
demned such activity as "gazing with awe ••• upon the 
'posterior' of the Russian proletariat."33 
By 1902 Lenin had firmly arrived at the distinction 
between agitation and propaganda which he was to use 
throughout the rest of his revolutionary career and 
which was to carry over, to a certain extent, into the 
present in Soviet Russia. 
presented his definitions. 
In What Is To Be Done? Lenin ----
He first quoted one of Ple-
khanov's works, Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight 
Against the Famine in Russia: 11A propagandist presents 
many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator pre-
sents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to 
33Lenin, Works Vol. 5, pp. 447-48. Is To Be 
Done?, March, 1902. 
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a mass of people. 1134 Thus, the final distinction turned 
not on the content of the message but on the audience 
for which it was intended. There were two types of 
audiences: the intellectual few to whom many ideas were 
presented and the masses to whom one or a few ideas were 
given. Lenin then developed this concept further: 
••• the propagandist, dealing with, say, 
the question of unemployment, must explain 
the capitalistic nature of crises, the cause 
of their inevitability in modern society, 
the necessity for the transformation of this 
society into a socialist society, etc. In a 
word, he must present "many ideas", so many, 
indeed, that they will be understood as an 
integral whole only by a (comparatively) few 
persons. The agitator, however, speaking on 
the same subject, will take as an illustra-
tion a fact that is most glaring and most 
widely known to his audience, say, the death 
of an unemployed worker's family from star-
vation, the growing impoverishment, etc., 
and, utilising this fact, known to all, will 
direct his efforts to presenting~ single 
idea to the 11masses", e.g., the senselessness 
of the contradiction between the increase 
of wealth and the increase of poverty; he 
will strive to rouse discontent and indigna-
tion among ~he masses against this crying 
inJustice, leaving a more complete explana-
tion of this contradiction to the propagan-
dist. Consequently, the propagandist oper-
ates chiefly by means of the printed word; 
the agitator by means of the spoken word. 
The propagandist requires qualities dif-
ferent from those of the agitator.~5 
In this definition we see a clear distinction between 
propaganda and agitation. 
34-Ibid., p. 4-09. See also Baron, .2J2.• .£11., p. 151. 
35Ibid., PP• 4-09-10. 
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One important result of the definitional distinc-
tion was that referring to the medium proper to or 
mainly used by each: the agitator was to use primarily 
the spoken word, the propagandist the written word. 
This simply meant that there was a primary medium for 
each. Naturally, the agitator might use printed mater-
ial such as factory leaflets calling for a strike or 
explaining the workers' position during a strike. Lenin 
himself wrote many such leaflets. The propagandist 
might, of course, use the spoken word, as Lenin himself 
did on such occasions as Party conferences, Party con-
gresses, meetings of editorial boards, worker circles, 
and the like. But for each type of persuasive activity 
Lenin prescribed a primary medium, one to be emphasized 
as most appropriate to that type. 
Another important factor is the number of people 
involved in each audience. Chakotin quoted Lenin, al-
though he did not indicate the source: 111 The revolu-
tionary propagandist must think in terms of hundreds, 
the agitator in terms of tens of thousands, and the or-
ganizer and leader of the revolution in terms of mil-
lions! • 1136 Lenin himself, of course, was to be that 
11 leader of the revolution." 
don: 
We have already seen that Lenin's definitions of 
36serge Chakotin, The Rape of the Masses (Lon-
George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1939), p. 165. 
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the terms "agitation'' and "propaganda" were not really 
original definitions; they had a significant history of 
use and development by the St. Petersburg Social Demo-
crats, by the Polish Union 9 and by the Social Democrats 
abroad, as indicated by the Plekhanov quotation in What 
Is To Be Done? ------
Because Lenin adopted these definitions, they are 
still used to a certain extent today in the Soviet 
Union. Clews wrote: 
But where British and American defi-
nitions still use fairly general terms, the 
standard Soviet Dictionary-encyclopedia is 
far more specific o 21Propaganda, 11 it de-
.fines, "is the interpretation of ideas, 
teachings, political opinions and knowledge, 
component parts of the work of the ~ommunist 
and workers' parties in the ideological 
training of the party masses and the toil-
ers." In short, to communists propagand&7 is an essential feature of their system.~ 
Chakotin includes a further group con-
cept, which has been a fundamental basis of 
communist propaganda for more than sixty 
years. He divides people into two groups 
--the ten per cent which make up the active 
minority and the ninety per cent which total 
the passive maJority. Though he does not 
say so, this is the same grouping as that 
classified by the communists as cadres and 
masses. For the former propaganda is so-
phisticated, for the latter it is simple, 
categoric and direct, designed to influence 
the emotions, not the mind.38 
It seems, then, that perhaps the Communists today do not 
37John c. Clews, Communist Propa~anda Techniques 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, p. 4. 
38Ibid., p. 10. 
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draw the same clear distinction between the two terms 
11 agitation 11 and 11propaganda 11 but, if Clews is correct, 
they do still clearly differentiate between the two 
functions these terms covered, between the two types 
of audiences to which the terms applied. 
Agitation and Propaganda: General Task 
Having established the definitions for the terms 
"agitation" and "propaganda, 11 we may now turn to the 
functions these two persuasive techniques were to per-
form. And, at the most general level, the terms "edu-
cation" and 11 class consciousness 11 come to the fore-
ground. 
Lenin always maintained a single attitude toward 
the masses: he always believed that they were simply 
uneducated, uninformed, or, in his usual terminology, 
they lacked class consciousness. The Social Democrats 
could win the masses by simply showing them the truth. 
In contrast to this, he always believed that his ene-
mies, the bourgeoisie and the heretical socialists, 
were deceitful, cunning, malign, and always acted toward 
the Social Democrats and the proletariat and peasantry 
with malice aforethought. As a generalization, it may 
be said that Lenin believed that the bourgeoisie and 
the monarchists were attempting to deceive the masses, 
but that these attempts at deception could be thwarted 
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if the Social Democrats would merely educate the masses. 
As he put it in a speech on August 28, 1918, at the 
first All-Russia Congress on Education, 11 Fducation is 
one of the component parts of the struggle we are now 
waging. We can counter hypocrisy and lies with the com-
plete and honest truth. 1139 We may now examine Lenin's 
beliefs summarized above in more detail. 
Let us first take Lenin's attitude toward those to 
be educated, or, if you will, Lenin's analysis of his 
audience. In 1901 he wrote an article entitled "The 
Journal Svoboda 11 in which he set forth his conception 
of the masses to be educated: 
The popular writer does not presuppose a 
reader that does not think, that cannot or 
does not wish to think; on the contrary, he 
assumes in the undeveloped reader a serious 
intention to use his head and aids him in 
his serious and difficult work-;--Ie"ads him¼ 
helps him over his first steps, and teaches 
him to go forward independently. The vulgar 
writer assumes that his reader does not 
think and is incapable of thinking; he does 
not lead him in his first steps towards 
serious knowledge, but in a distortedly 
simplified form, interlarded with jokes 
and racetiousness, hands out "ready-made" 
all the conclusions of a known theory, so 
that the reader does not even have to chew 
but merely to swallow what he is given.40 
This position is typical; the uneducated masses were 
39Lenin, Works Vol. 28, p. 87. Speech at the first 
All-Russia Congress on Education, August 28, 1918. 
40Lenin, Works Vol. 5, pp. 311-12. "The Journal 
Svoboda," written in the autumn of 1901, f'irst published 
in 1936. 
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seen as serious-minded, willing to learn, eager to think 
for themselves if someone would only give them the basic 
tools for thinking and would only aid them in taking the 
"first steps.u It must be remembered that in Russia 
this was in itself an enormous task. The masses were 
largely illiterate; those who were eager to learn, as 
we have seen, were, for good reason, suspicious of the 
revolutionary intellectuals. Nevertheless, Lenin be-
lieved that much progress had been made by the revolu-
tionaries. Although he may have been overly-optimistic, 
in 1905 he stated: 
In the beginning we had to teach the workers 
the ABC, both in the literal and in the fig-
urative senses. Now the standard of poli-
tical literacy has risen so gigantically that 
we can and should concentrate all our efforts 
on the more direct Social-Democratic objectives 
aimed at giving an organised direction to the 
revolutionary stream.~l 
In 1906 election campaigns were held for the 
Second Dumae Lenin indicated his analysis of the masses 
in an article which appeared on December 24 (0.S.): 
Such are the conditions in which the 
election campaign for the Second Duma is being 
inaugurated. The ordinary man in the street 
is cowed. He has been intimidated by the 
military courts. He is under the spell of the 
government's boast that the Duma will be do-
cile. He yields to !his mood and is ready to 
forgive the Cadets La moderate partil7 all 
their mistakes~ to throw overboard all that 
the First Duma taught him and vote for the 
Cadets if only the Black Hundreds L,monarch-
41Lenin, Works Vol. 8, p. 216. "New Tasks and 
New Forces," Vperyod No. 9, March 8 (Feb. 23), 1905. 
63 
ist§.7 are kept outo 
That the ordinary man in the street 
should behave in this way is natural. He is 
never guided by a definite world-outlook, by 
principles of integral party tactics. He 
always swims with the stream, blindly obey-
ing the mood of the momento He cannot reason 
in any other way than by contrasting the most 
moderate of all the opposition parties to the 
Black Hundreds. He is incapable of thinking 
for himself over the experience of the First 
Dumae42 
The task of the Social Democrats, of course, was to 
help educate these common men-in-the-street to enable 
them to think through the experiences of the First 
Duma, to guide them in their first attempts at politi-
cal analysis. The one thing that was lacking in these 
common people was political consciousness, the conscious-
ness that they were members of a class and had common 
class interests. The educational activities of the 
Social Democrats would have to help develop this class 
consciousness. 
later in Lenin's career~ especially during the 
decade preceding the 1917 Revolution, he was much con-
cerned with specific aspects of the education which the 
Social Democrats should give to the workers. This, of 
course, was the decade in which the war broke out after 
a long period of high tension. It was a period of 
reaction in Russia, and at the end was a violent up-
42Lenin, Works Vol. 11, pp. 389-90. "The Politi-
cal Situation and the Tasks of the Working Class," Ter-
nii Truda No. 1, Jan. 6, 1907 (Dec. 24, 1906). 
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heaval. Several examples of issues Lenin singled out 
for analysis during this period may indicate his general 
attitude toward the masses and the Social Democratic 
Party's duty toward themo In 1912? as our first ex-
ample, Lenin wrote an article entitled "Two Utopias" in 
which he indicated the importance of education: 
Utopia is a Greek word, composed of .2£, 
not, and topos, a placeo It means a place 
which does not exist, a fantasy, invention or 
fairy-tale. 
In politics utopia is a wish that can 
never come true--neither now nor afterwards, 
a wish that is not based on social forces and 
is not supported by the growth and development 
of political? class forces. 
The less freedom there is in a country, 
the scantier the manifestations of open class 
struggle and the lower the educational level 
of the masses, the more easily political utopias 
usually arise and the longer they persist.43 
The utopian concepts could be combatted by two means: 
by increasing the amount of freedom, and/or by increas-
ing the educational level of the masses. It is interest-
ing to contrast this quotation and the one given prior 
to it with the much more optimistic attitude expressed 
in 1905 (note 41). 1905, of course, was a year of 
great revolutionary activity, strikes, demonstrations, 
Bloody Sunday, and finally the October Manifesto grant-
ing an elected legislature. The article quoted was writ-
ten in the very midst of this activity, in March of that 
year. Its tone was much more optimistic than that of 
43Lenin, Works Vol. 18, p. 355. "Two Utopias, 11 
written in October, 1912, first published in 1924. 
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the following two quotations; but this is getting away 
from the heart of the point at issue. 
In 1913 Lenin contended: 
We cannot guarantee the realisation of 
our demands by reducing them, by curtailing 
our programme~ or by adopting the tactics of 
attracting unenlightened people with the 
deceptive promise of easy constitutional re-
forms under Russian tsarismo We can guaran-
tee it only by educating the masses in the 
spirit of consistent democracy and awareness 
of the falsity of constitutional illusions. 
The guarantee lies in the revolutionary 
organisation of the foremost class, the pro-
letariat, and in the great revolutionary 
enthusiasm of the masses.44 
Again, we see education of the masses as the key. A 
year and a half later, in June, 1914, Lenin presented 
a more detailed explanation of this contention: 
Like a mother who carefully tends a sick 
child and gives it better nourishment, the 
class-conscious workers must take more care of 
the districts and factories where the workers 
are sick with liquidationism. This malady, 
which emanates from the bourgeoisie, is inev-
itable in a young working-class movement, but 
with proper care and persistent treatment, it 
will pass without any serious after-effects. 
To provide the sick workers with more plentiful 
nourishment in the shape of Marxist literature, 
to explain more carefully and in more popular 
form the history and tactics of the Party and 
the meaning of the Party decisions on the 
bourgeois nature of liquidationism, to explain 
at greater length the urgent necessity of 
proletarian unity, i.e., the submission of 
the minority of the workers to the majority, 
the submission of the one-fifth to the four-
fifths of the class-conscious workers of 
44Lenin, Works Vol. 18, p. 453. 11 Notification and 
Resolutions of the Meeting of the Central Committee of 
the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Functionaries," Feb., 1913. 
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Russia--such are some of the most important 
tasks confronting us.45 
Liquidationism was a heresy which maintained that the 
illegal, underground aspect of Social Democracy in 
Russia should be Hliquidated" and all Party workers 
should then concentrate solely on legal activities. 
That this heresy probably had great appeal to the workers 
in the major Russian cities can be inferred from two 
factors: 1) the great lengths to which Lenin went to 
refute this heresy, and 2) the long-standing interest of 
the worker circles in avoiding illegal activities and 
concentrating on those that would not involve them with 
the czarist policee At any rate, it important to 
note that Lenin's answer to the appeal of liquidationism 
was to provide education in the form of Marxist litera-
ture, containing explanations of the heresy and the 
class interest it represented. That is, his answer was 
to intensify agitation and propaganda. 
In the period from 1914 to 1917 Lenin faced a dif-
ferent problem in regard to World War One. Lenin op-
posed this war, not because he was a pacifist--which he 
most certainly was not--but because it was an 11 imperial-
ist" war in which only imp,erialists could win. If Rus-
sia stayed in the war, he believed, the Russian workers 
45Lenin, Works Vol. 20, p. 371. "The Working Class 
and Its Press," Trudovaya Pravda No. 15, June 27 (14), 
1914. 
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would emerge from the war more oppressed than before, 
regardless of which side won9 However, at least at 
first, the war was a very popular one in Russia; not 
only did the workers support it, but many of the so-
called socialists favored the Russian war effort, adopt-
ing the heresy of "revolutionary defencism" or nation-
alism. This heresy, Lenin thought, was the result of 
bourgeois deception and lack of class consciousness on 
the part of the proletariat. In September, 1917, during 
the period of the Provisional Government, Lenin wrote 
"The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution." The 
monarchy had been overthrown, but Lenin believed that 
the bourgeoisie who controlled the new government were 
just as bad as, if not worse than, the monarchy in their 
attitude toward the workers: 
The slogan "Down with the Warl 11 is, of 
course, correct. But it fails to take into 
account the specific nature of the tasks of 
the present moment and the necessity of .§1?_-
proaching the broad mass of the people in~ 
different wa~c It reminds me of the slogan 
11 Down with the Tsar! 11 with which the inexper-
ienced agitator of the "good old days" went 
simply and directly to the countryside--and 
got a beating for his pains. The mass be-
lievers in revolutionary defencism are honest, 
not in the personal, but in the class sense, 
i.e., they belong to classes (workers and the 
peasant poor) which in actual fact have nothing 
to gain from annexations and the subJugation 
of other peoples. This is nothing like the 
bourgeois and the "intellectual" fraternity, 
who know very well that you cannot renounce 
annexations without renouncing the rule of 
capital, and who unscrupulously deceive the 
people with fine phrases, with unlimited prom-
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ises and endless assuranceso 
The rank-and-file believer in defencism 
regards the matter in the simple way of the 
man in the street: 11 1 don't want annexations, 
but the Germans are 'going for' me, therefore 
rvm defending a Just cause and not any kind of 
imperialist interests at allo" To a man like 
this it must be explained again and again that 
it is not a question of his personal wishes, 
but of mass, class, political relations and 
conditions, of the connection between the war 
and the interests of capital and the inter-
national network of banks, and so forth. Only 
such a struggle against defencism will be 
serious and will promise success--perhaps not 
a very rapid ~gccess, but one that will be real 
and enduring. 
At least from 1902 on, in appealing to the workers, 
in educating them to be class conscious, in showing 
them exactly where their class interests lay, Lenin al-
ways placed the emphasis on the political aspects. Even 
though Marxism was an essentially economic doctrine, 
Leninism was essentially political. This was a fact 
noted by Sukhanov, who wrote after the Revolution: 
Socialism is, of course, primarily an economic 
problem. I have indicated that the Bolsheviks 
were weak on thiso Neither Lenin, elaborating 
the programme of his party, nor Trotsky, doing 
the same for the former Interdistrictites, ap-
preciated the significance of an economic pro-
gramme as such, or gave it priority; indeed, 
they simply forgot about it.47 
While we cannot agree with Sukhanov that Lenin simply 
forgot about economic programs and the economic aspects 
46Lenin, Works Vol. 24, pp. 65-66. "The Tasks of 
the Proletariat in Our Revolution," September, 1917. 
47N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1.21.2., 
trans. and ed. by Joel Carmichael (2 vols.; New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1962), II, p. 554. 
69 
of the class struggle, it is certainly true that he did 
not give the economic aspects priority. 
As early as 1897, in his article The Tasks of the 
Russian Social-Democrats 9 Lenin indicated the impor-
tance of politics: 
In conducting agitation among the workers on 
their immediate economic demands, the Social-
Democrats inseparably link this with agitation 
on the immediate political needs, the distress 
and the demands of the working class, agitation 
against police tyranny, manifested in every 
strike, in every conflict between workers and 
capitalists, agitation against the restriction 
of the rights of the workers as Russian citi-
zens in general and as the class suffering the 
worst oppression and having the least rights 
in particular, agitation against every promi-
nent representative and flunkey of absolutism 
who comes into direct contact with the workers 
and who clearly reveals to the working class 
its condition of political slavery.48 
In 1897, then, Lenin had stated the importance of poli-
tical agitation in connection with economic problems. 
This was to change somewhat later, so thati by 1902, in 
What Is To Be Done?, Lenin contended that political 
agitation must have priority over economic agitation: 
The fact that economic interests play a deci-
sive role does not in the least imply that the 
economic (i.eo 9 trade-union) struggle is of 
prime importance; for the most essential, the 
"decisive" interests of classes can be satis-
fied onl~ by radical political changes in gen-
eral. In particular the fundamental economic 
interests of the proletariat can be satisfied 
only by a political revolution that will re-
48 Lenin~ Works Vol. 2, p. 332. The Tasks of the 
Russian Social-Democrats, written at the end of 1s9v;-
first published in Geneva in 1898. 
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place the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by 
the dictatorship of the proletariat.49 
o •• not only must Social-Democrats not con-
fine themselves exclusively to the economic 
struggle, but o o • they must not allow the 
organisation of economic exposures to be-
come the predominant part of their activi-
ties. We must take up actively the poli-
tical education of the working class and 
the d~0elopment of its political conscious-ness., 
Thus, the political aspects of the class struggle had 
become dominant in Lenin's thinking, and hence were to 
predominate in the Social Democrats' education of the 
workers. Lenin went on to refute the 11 pompous phrase 
about 'lending the economic struggle itself a political 
character' 11 which had been advanced by some. This, he 
contended, would degrade "Social-Democratic politics to 
the level of trade-union politics.u5l It seems, then, 
that Lenin did not even want the Social Democrats to 
worry much about the economic struggle; they were to 
concentrate on educating the masses to be politically 
conscious. 
A second task of education, previously mentioned 
in passing, was that of fighting deception of the 
masses by the bourgeoisie. Lenin always thought that 
his opponents were vicious men attempting to deceive 
49Lenin, Works Volo 5, pp. 390-91. What Is To Be 
Done?, March, 1902G 
50ibid., p. 400. 
51Ibid., p. 405. 
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the masses into believing something other than his own 
pure truth. He was quite clear in his contention that 
class consciousness, specifically political conscious-
ness on the part of the workers, would counter the at-
tempts at deception made by the bourgeoisie. For example, 
in 1914 he wrote: 
But class-conscious workers will not be 
deceived by the rantings of sham "political 
campaigns 11 launched by the disruptors of the 
workers' organisation. What class-conscious 
workers appreciate most of all and first of 
all in every press organ is adherence to high 
principleo What are the workers really being 
taught under cover of the 11 opposition11 clap-
trap, clamour and claims to defend the inter-
ests of the workers?--that is the main, the 
basic and, properly speaking, the only impor-
tant question that every thinking worker asks 
himself. The thinking worker knows that the 
most dangerous of advisers are those liberal 
friends of the workers who claim to be defend-
ing their interests, but are actually trying 
to destroy the class independen~e of the pro-
letariat and its organisation.~ 
The major enemy of the proletariat, Lenin thought, 
was not the monarchy, which was readily identifiable, 
but the bourgeoisie which might deceive the workers. 
This greatest of all enemies was the one which was to 
be fought by class consciousness; the monarchy, of course, 
could be fought even by the liberal bourgeoisie. Our 
point is, then, that political consciousness was impor-
tant to fight deception. 
52Lenin, Works Vol. 20, p. 90. "The Liberals' 
Corruption of the Workers, 11 Put Pravdy No. 9, Feb. 13 
(Jan. 31), 1914. 
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Lenin analyzed specific attempts at "deception" by 
the bourgeoisie which were to be combatted by Social 
Democratic persuasion, iaeo, by agitation and propaganda. 
For illustration, we may take several examples from Len-
inws writings, in chronological order. On April 19, 
1905 (O.S.), during the first major revolution in Rus-
sia, Lenin wrote: 11 The government is up to its old game 
of trying to fool the peasantry with sham concessions. 
This policy of corruption must be countered with the 
slogans of our Party. 1153 Later that same year, after 
the czar had promised a loosening of his rule, Lenin 
indicated one way in which the government could deceive 
the masses: 
Granting for a moment the improbable and the 
impossible~ namely, that the tsarist govern-
ment, having decided to convene a 11 Constitu-
ent11 (read: consultative) Assembly, will give 
formal guarantees of freedom of propaganda, 
all the vast advantages and superior facil-
ities for campaigning which accrue from the 
organised power of the state will neverthe-
less remain in its hands. These advantages 
and facilities for propaganda during the 
elections to the first people's assembly will 
be enjoyed by the very ones who have oppressed 
the people by all the means in their power, 
and from whom the
5
Eeople have begun to wrest 
liberty by forceo 
53Lenin, Works Volo 8, Po 4000 Report on the Res-
olution on the support of the peasant movement, to The 
Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., May 2 (April 19), 
1905. 
54Lenin, Works Vole> 8, p. 516. nThe Democratic 
Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat, 11 Proletary No. 
4, June 17 (4), 1905. 
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In October, 1905, in the famous October Manifesto, 
the czar promised to grant an elected Duma, or parlia-
ment, and soon political parties were formed to contest 
the elections. One of these parties was the Constitu-
tional Democratic Party, better known as the Cadets. 
This party was of great concern to Lenin, since he be-
lieved it to be one of those bourgeois parties which 
were the special enemies of the proletariat, and since 
it enjoyed more success than any other 11 liberal" party. 
In 1906, following a mass meeting, he wrote: 
The popular meeting in the Panina Palace 
seemed particularly outrageous to the Cadet 
gentlemeno The Social-Democrats' speeches at 
the meeting stirred up that putrid swamp. 
11 Have a heart~ 11 cry the Cadet gentlemen, 11 you 
are helping the government with your criticism 
of our party. 11 It is a familiar argument. 
Whenever the Social-Democrats step forward to 
explain to the proletariat and the people as a 
whole the real meaning of the events that are 
taking place~ to dispel the fog which the 
bourgeois politicians are spreading over the 
workers~ to warn the workers against the bour-
geois traders of people's freedom, and to show 
the workers their true place in the revolution, 
the liberal gentlemen cry that this weakens 
the revolution.55 
A month later, he warned that 11 to combat the treacherous 
tactics of the Cadets what is required is not to echo 
the Codota, but to preserve completo indopendence, thut 
1s to say, to warn the proletariat and the peasants not 
to trust the Cadets, not to repeat the Cadet slogans." 
55Lenin, Works Vol. 10, p. 4-19. 11 Resolution and 
Revolution, 11 Volna No. 16, May 26 (13), 1906. 
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Those who advocated advancing slogans similar to the 
Cadet slogans were 11 selling our revolutionary birth-
right for a mess of Cadet reformist pottage. 11 56 As we 
shall see later~ Lenin was much concerned lest the Social 
Democrats advance slogans which were also being advanced 
by less revolutionary parties. He wanted to maintain 
not only the independence referred to here, but also 
clear symbols which would enable the masses to identify 
the Social Democrats as a separate party, not merely a 
member of a group of similar liberal parties. 
In 1912, elections to the Duma were held, and a 
campaign was conducted rather like any campaign in any 
democratic country, with parties~ platforms, election-
eering, promises, and, in Lenin's words, "the most brazen 
self-advertisement. 11 Naturally, this was Just on the 
part of the bourgeois and monarchist parties. Lenin 
compared the political advertisements to commercial ones~ 
11 Look at the commercial advertisements in any newspaper--
you will see that the capitalists think up the most 
'striking', bombastic and fashionable names for their 
merchandise, which they praise in the most unrestrained 
manner, stopping at no lio or invention whatever," The 
political parties of bourgeois tendencies, he continued, 
were doing precisely the same in the campaign. This 
56Lenin, Works Vol. 11, p. 67. "Yes-Men of the 
Cadets," Ekho No. 5, July 10 (June 27), 1906. 
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presented a problem., he believed~ in that "political ad-
vertisement misleads an incomparably greater number of 
people" than does commercial merchandising since the 
former "is much harder to expose and its deception much 
more lasting." Lenin carried the analogy further, noting 
the similarity between the labeling of brand-names and 
the choosing of names for a political party: "The names 
of some parties~ both in Europe and in Russia, are chosen 
with a direct eye to advertisement, and their 'pro-
grammes0 are quite often written for the sole purpose 
of hoodwinking the public a ,i57 Of course, the Social 
Democrats were to act otherwise; for example, they were 
to stick to their party principles in the development of 
a program or platform and to maintain the strictest 
adherence to principle in campaigning. 
After the elections were over, and the government 
had settled down to acting quite as it had before, Lenin 
wrote that the masses were politically ignorant, that 
they lacked the ability to look for exact proofs "con-
cerning controversial and important historical ques-
tions,11 and that they placed "naive credence" in "shout-
ing and expostulation, and ••• the assurances and 
vows made by people with interests at stake. 11 58 The 
57Lenin, Works Vol. 18, p. 44. 11 Political Parties 
in Russia," Nevsknya Zvezdo. No. 5, May 23 (10), 1912. 
58Lenin, Wo.rks Vol. 19, p .. 228. "Notes of a Pub-
licist," f3o toJ.nl-JJGmok.rn t No. 31, Juno 28 ( 1~), 1913. 
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Social Democrats, again, could overcome this by educat-
ing the masses, through agitation and propaganda, to be-
come class conscious. 
After World War One began, Lenin found another 
area, mentioned earlier, of deception of the masses. 
On the one hand, there was the heresy of revolutionary 
defencism, or nationalism. On the other hand, there 
were also prophets of pacifism within Russia who, Lenin 
contended, were equally bad. In 1915 he wrote: 
Pacifism, the preaching of peace in the 
abstract, is one of the means of duping the 
working class •• o • 
At the present time, the propaganda of 
peace unaccompanied by a call for revolution-
ary mass action can only sow illusions and 
demoralise the proletariat, for it makes the 
proletariat believe that the bourgeoisie is 
humane 9 and turns it into a plaything in the 
hands of the secret diplomacy of the bellig-
erent countries. In particular, the idea of 
a so-called democratic peace being possible 
without a p~ries of revolutions is profoundly 
erroneous.,~ 
During the first part of the war, the Russian 
nation unified behind the czar once again--as it turned 
out, for the last time. However, due to inept policies 
and military disasters, the Russian people gradually 
became more dissatisfied, leading eventually to the 
overthrow of the autocracy in March, 1917, and finally 
to the overthrow of the Provisional Government in Novem-
59Lenin, Works Vol. 21, PPo 162-63. 11 The Confer-
ence of the R.S.D.L.P~ Groups Abroad," Sotsial-Demokrat 
No. 40, March 29 (16), 1915. 
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ber (N.S.) of ~he same year. During this time, however, 
from 1905 to 1917, the Russian people had the chance 
to experiment with democracy, at least in some small de-
gree. Lenin was dissatisfied with the results, which 
he saw as mere deception of the masses. In 1916 he 
wrote concerning democracy: 
Nothing in our times can be done without elec-
tions; nothing can be done without the masses. 
And in this era of printing and parliamentar-
ism it is impossible to gain the following of 
the masses without a widely ramified, system-
atically managed, well-equipped system of 
flattery, lies, fraud, Juggling with fashion-
able and popular catchwords, and promising 
all manner of reforms and blessings to the 
workers right and left--as long as they re-
nounce the revolutionary struggle for the 
overthrow of the bourgeoisie9 I would call 
this system Lloyd-Georgism, after the English 
Minister Lloyd George, one of the foremost 
and most dexterous representatives of this 
system in the classic land of the "bourgeois 
labour party"o60 
To overcome the deception of those bourgeois labor par-
ties the masses must be educated, which, as we have 
seen several times previously, was a function of agita-
tion and propaganda. 
One of the major issues in this period of politi-
cal experimentation was that of a responsible ministry. 
The Duma was elected as a legislature, but the ministers 
were appointed solely by the czar and were responsible 
only to the throne. The Duma could not cause a ministry 
60 Lenin, Works Vol. 23, p. 117. "Imperialism and 
the Split in Socialism," Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata No. 
2, December, 1916. 
78 
to fall, as they could if a responsible government were 
adopted. Levin, in his history of the Second Duma, 
summarized the two Social Democratic Party factions' 
positions on this most important question: the Menshe-
viks favored a Duma ministry, but the Bolsheviks opposed 
it. The Bolsheviks--here Levin clearly meant Lenin him-
self: the articles he cited in this section were all 
by Lenin--were very suspicious of a Duma ministry. 
Lenin feared that it would involve a deal between the 
government and the bourgeoisie at the expense of the 
people; furthermore, it would merely foster constitu-
tional illusions and thus detract from the revolution-
ary consciousness of the proletariat. In short, it 
would deceive the workers into believing that they were 
actually making headway under the czar, without over-
throwing the entire system. 61 
In 1917 Lenin raised identical objections to the 
Pre-parliament which he thought had as its aim "to trick 
the masses, to deceive the workers and peasants, to dis-
tract them from the new upsurge of the revolution, to 
dazzle the eyes of the oppressed classes by a new dress 
for the old, long tried-out, bedraggled, threadbare 
'coalition• with the bourgeoisie 1162 
61Alfred Levin, The Second Duma (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1940),p. 510 
62Lenin, Works Vol. 26, PJ?• 55-56. "From a Publi-
cist's Diary," Octe 5 (Sept. 22), 1917, published, 1924. 
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In 1918, when speaking to a group of propagandists 
on their way to the provinces, Lenin said of the bour-
geoisie: "One day they bribe ignorant soldiers to raid 
wine and spirit warehouses; the next day they get rail-
way officials to hold up freights or shipowners to hold 
up grain barges, etco, on their way to the capital. 11 It 
was to be the task of these propagandists to bring order 
to the provinces which would show the workers and peas-
ants that "they need have no fear of any tricks on the 
part of the bourgeoisie. 1163 
Lenin almost always came back to the basic con-
tention that the agitators and propagandists, the Social 
Democratic professional persuaders, were to educate, to 
show, to explain over and over again, to demonstrate. 
Only this would produce the class consciousness need-
ed--if the workers could but see where their real class 
interests lay, they would adopt those class interests 
as their own personal goals. If a person were but shown 
the truth, he would follow it--at least if that person 
were a member of the proletarian class. 
Generally, we have now seen, Lenin conceived of 
persuasion as a means of education, at least in relation 
to the proletariat. However, he was much more concerned 
63Lenin, Works Vol. 26, p. 514. Report of a speech 
to propagandists on their way to the provinces, Pravda 
No. 18, Feb. 6 (Jan. 24), 1918; the speech was delivered 
on Feb. 5 (Jan. 23), 1918. 
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in his writings with specific tasks of persuasion, and 
it is to these specific tasks that we may now turn our 
attention. 
Agitation and Propaganda: Specific Tasks 
The question, 11 What specifically was agitation and 
propaganda to do? 11 is a very complex one and, as is true 
of most questions dealing with Lenin, one that he never 
answered systematically. For Lenin, the tasks of agi-
tation and propaganda were entirely ad hoc ones: 11 im-
mediate tasks 11 or 11 tasks of the moment" were often-used 
phrases. Out of the plethora of specific tasks which 
Lenin discussed, we will attempt to select several rep-
resentative ones and present them here since an entire 
presentation of all the specific tasks which Lenin dele-
gated to agitation and propaganda would actually involve 
quotation of the major part of the material in his thir-
ty-eight volumes of Collected Works. 
Basically, Lenin believed that agitation and propa-
ganda had the task of enlisting support for the Russian 
Social Democratic Labor Party, specifically the Bolshe-
vik faction. That, however, is a very high level gen-
eralization; a number of more specific tasks can be 
found without delving into all the details of the Party 
programs and the specific problems which arose during 
Lenin's revolutionary career. From the point of view of 
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the Party, then, Lenin believed that agitation and propa-
ganda, properly conducted, would ensure the Party of a 
place in society, especially in the society which would 
follow a revolutiono As early as 1902 he wrote that 
those "who make nation-wide political agitation the cor-
ner-stone of their programme, their tactics, and their 
organisational work ••• stand the least risk of miss-
ing the revolution. 1164 
To develop Lenin's ideas more fully, we will take, 
in chronological order, a number of the more important 
points. Turning first to his period of exile, in 1897, 
Lenin wrote The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats --
in which appeared one very important generalization about 
the tasks of agitation and propaganda. He contended 
that "simultaneously with the dissemination of scientific 
socialism" the Social Democrats should propagate "demo-
cratic ideas among the working-class masses" and should 
' strive to spread an understanding of absolutism 
in all its manifestations, of its class content, 
of the necessity to overthrow it, of the im-
possibility of waging a successful struggle for 
the workers' cause without achieving political 
liberty and the democratisat~pn of Russia's 
political and social system.) 
Here Lenin set out three basic tasks for the propagan-
64Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 513. What Is To Be 
Done?, March, 1902. 
65Lenin, Works Volo 2, p. 332. The Tasks of the 
Russian Social-Democrats, written at the end of 189-;r,-
published in Geneva in 1898. 
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dists and agitators of his Party: 1) to disseminate 
scientific socialism, which, naturally, would be pri-
marily undertaken among the proletariat, rather than 
the peasantry; 2) to propagate democratic ideas among 
the working-class masses, these ideas to be directed at 
all workers in Russia; and 3) to spread an understanding 
of absolutism in all its manifestations. This final 
task was to be directed at and undertaken among all the 
various classes of Russian society which could possibly 
become anti-monarchist. 
Two years later, in 1899, while still in Siberia, 
Lenin wrote "Apropos of the Profession de Foi, 11 another 
article of refutatione In this article, he stressed 
the task of enlisting support for the class struggle 
from among the working class. He contended that it was 
a task of agitation to 
encourage the political struggle in all con-
ceivable manifestations, to organise this 
struggle and transform it from its spontaneous 
forms into the struggle of a single political 
party. Agitation, therefore, must serve as 
a means of widely expanding the political pro-
test and ige more organised forms of political 
struggle. 
Here still other tasks are presented: not .only must 
agitation enlist the support of more workers, but it 
should also expand specifically the organized forms of 
66Lenin 7 Works Vol .. 4, p. 294. 11Apropos of the 




We now come to 1902 and, for our purposesi Lenin's 
primary work? What Is To Be Done? Here a number of 
important functions of agitation and propaganda were 
presented. The first was that of helping to develop 
theoreticians from among the working masses. Lenin 
believed that the class struggle required an ideology 
developed by the professional revolutionaries. However: 
This does not mean, of course, that the 
workers have no part in creating such an ideol-
ogy. They take part, however, not as workers, 
but as socialist theoreticians, as Proudhons 
and Weitlings; in other words, they take part 
only when they are able, and to the extent that 
they are able? more or less, to acquire the 
knowledge of their age and develop that know-
ledge o But in order that working men may 
succeed in this more often, every effort must 
be made to raise the level of the consciousness 
of the workers in general; it is necessary that 
the workers do not confine themselves to the 
artificially restricted limits of "literature 
for workers 11 but that they learn to an increasing 
degree to master general literature. It would 
be even truer to say 11 are not confined 11 , instead 
of 11 do not confine themselves 11 , because the 
workers themselves wish to read and do read all 
that is written for the intelligentsia, and 
only a few (bad) intellectuals believe that it 
is enough 1'for workers II to be told a few things 
about factory conditions and to have repeated 
to them ove6 and over again what has long been known. 7 
In this work Lenin would seem to have set a limit to 
agitation, and a starting point ror propaganda among the 
workers. To develop more worker-theoreticians, the gen-
67Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 384. What Is To Be 
Done?, March, 1902. 
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eral level of the workers must be raised; this, apparent-
ly, would allow for an opportunity for more workers of 
ability to have the chance to become advanced theoreti-
cians. To do this, agitation was not enough; notice 
that Lenin condemns the mere repetition of "what has long 
been known." As we have seen when discussing the defini-
tions of the two terms, "agitation" and "propaganda," 
this would necessitate a change from the former to the 
latter. 
Secondly, Lenin argued in What Is To Be Done? 
that agitation and propaganda should enable the Party to 
increase its support among the masses. In the 1902 pub-
lication, however, Lenin was more concerned with making 
a worker into a true Social Democrat than with merely 
enlisting his support. To become a Social Democrat, in 
Lenin's opinion, the worker had to have "a clear picture 
in his mind of the economic nature and the social and 
political features" of every important class in Russia: 
landlords and priests, state officials and peasants, 
students and vagabonds. The worker had to know the op-
eration of the class struggle: the class interests of 
the various groups mentioned above, the "inner workings" 
and "selfish str1vings 11 of each and every class, the 
interests which were reflected by specific institutions 
and laws. To get such a 11 clear picture 11 the Social Demo-
crats would have to present more than mere books for the 
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worker to read; they would have to present "living ex-
amples11--presumably themselves insofar as one class was 
concerned--and "political exposures.," these two condi-
tions being uessential and fundamental" for "training 
the masses in revolutionary activity. 1168 Thus, another 
task of agitation and propaganda was to educate the 
workers so that they would know all these ufacts 11 about 
their society and could therefore become true Social 
Democratso 
Furthermore, agitation and propaganda, in using 
political exposures, would help to isolate the czar and 
his monarchist supporterso Such a contention seems to 
have been based on the divide-and-conquer principle. 
Political exposures, Lenin wrote 9 would serve as "a 
powerful instrument for disintegrating the system we 
oppose, as a means for diverting from the enemy his 
casual or temporary allies, as a means for spreading 
hostility and distrust among the permanent partners of 
the autocracy. 1169 Presumably, this would be primarily 
a task for agitation, since the device to be used was 
exposure. Propaganda seems generally to have been re-
served for more long-range activities and to have used 
more pedestrian devices than exposures. 
68Ibid • ., p. 413 Q 
69Ibid., p. 431. 
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A fourth task was closely related to the second: 
to help relieve the Social Democratic Party of some of 
the burdens of routine affairs, which would largely 
result from the attraction of new and better members to 
the Party. At that time, 1902, the czarist government 
had loosened the restrictions on labor union-type or-
ganizations to enable the government itself, especially 
the secret police, to form unions. It was thought that 
if the government formed unions, it would both be able 
to control the organizations formed and at the same 
time satisfy the workers by providing them with "unions." 
It did not quite work out the way it was planned. Lenin 
believed that, in the long run, legalization of some 
union activities would help the Social Democrats, pri-
marily by giving them another example of governmental 
hypocrisy which would be relatively easy to expose. 
These exposures would attract ever larger numbers of 
workers to the Social Democratic Party and the new mem-
bers could take over many of the legal functions that 
were then absorbing much of the Party workers' time. 
Lenin suggested that the new members would be able to 
carry out such activities as distribution of legal books 
and "mutual aid, 11 which would have a snowball effect: 
tney would "inevitably provide us with an increasing 
quantity of material for agitation. 1170 Of course, the 
?Oibid., p. 455. 
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first step, as the last in this chain of reasoning, was 
successful agitation: the governmental unions must be 
exposed first, to attract new members to the Social 
Democrats, to do the legal work, to provide more material 
for more agitation. 
In April, 1902'} Lenin wrote "A Letter to the North-
ern League" in which he advised the League on matters 
of agitation and propaganda. In this letter, Lenin dis-
cussed two primary functions of propaganda: 1) as a 
means of training agitators and 2) as a means of spread-
ing class consciousness in generai.71 The first function 
is quite understandable, since it would be necessary to 
present to the prospective agitator many ideas, the wide 
range of theoretical work of Social Democracy. The agi-
tator would have to know and absorb the socialist theory 
to be able to conduct effective agitation; he would have 
to know what the Party line was to be able to present 
it with local illustrations. The second function has 
already been discussed when we examined the institution 
known as the worker circle. This activity, of course, 
continued throughout the pre-revolutionary period; there 
were always workers who wanted an education and the 
Social Democrats, as well as other revolutionaries, were 
71Lenin, Works Vol., 6, p. 167. "A Letter to the 
Northern League, 11 written in April, 1902, first pub-
lished in 1923. 
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always happy to provide it, with their own specific 
party lines attachedo 
At various times Lenin turned his attention to the 
agitational and propagandistic tasks in relation to the 
peasantry of Russia. An article of his appeared in 
1906 soon after the czar had dissolved the Duma: 
Of course, in our work of agitation we must, 
on the one hand, do all we can to explain to 
the peasants that it is absolutely legitimate 
and necessary to wage a pitiless struggle 
against the enemy 9 even to the extent of 
destroying his property; on the other hand, 
we must show.that on the degree of organisa-
tion depends the possibility of a much more 
rational and advantageous outcome of the 
struggle: destroying the enemy (the land-
lords and bureaucrats? especially the police) 
and transferring all property to the people, 
or to the peasants, intg~t (or with the 
least possible damage)./ 
It must be remembered that Lenin was not much concerned 
with the peasants. They were not, he thought, a truly 
revolutionary class; it would be many years before they 
would develop into oneQ They were bourgeois in attitude 
and would have to go through a period of development in 
which they would become worker-farmers before they would 
or could become truly revolutionary. However, he still 
had to face the fact that the vast majority of the Rus-
sian population was composed of peasants, and hence he 
could not ignore them entirely. In 1906, as at other 
72Lenin, Works Vol. 11, p. 123. "The Dissolution 
of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat," July, 
1906. 
89 
times, Lenin simply saw the peasants as possibly anti-
monarcnical because they were anti-landlord; they could 
be a useful ally in a revolution, but could not be the 
basis for a socialistic societyo Consistent with these 
beliefs, his advice concerning agitational and propa-
gandistic tasks among the peasantry was usually limited 
to two goals: 1) to foster the peasantry's hatred of 
the landlords and 2) restrain them from excessive de-
structiono 
As the first decade of this century ended and the 
second began, the strike activity in Russia increased 
tremendouslyo By 1913 it had grown to such proportions 
that Lenin believed there was another task for agita-
tion as a result of the increased activities of the 
workers in the economic sphere: 
The working class continues to act as 
the leader of the revolutionary struggle for 
nation-wide liberationo The mass revolution-
ary strike movement continues to grow. The 
genuine struggle waged by the advanced con-
tingents of the working class is proceeding 
under revolutionary sloganso 
Owing to the very circumstances of the 
struggle the mass economic movement, which in 
many cases starts with the most elementary de-
mands, is to an increasing degree merging with 
the revolutionary working-class movemento 
It is the task of the advanced workers 
to accelerate by their agitational and edu-
cational activities the process of uniting 
the proletariat under the revolutionary slo-
gans of the present epoch. Only in this way 
will the advanced workers succeed in fulfill-
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ing their other task of rousing the peasant 
and urban democrats.73 
By 1917, in the middle of the short life of the 
Provisional Government, Lenin perceived the main task 
for Social Democratic agitators to be one of exposure 
of the new forces governing Russia. The czar was safely 
in prison, but Lenin believed that the Provisional Gov-
ernment was not much betterq In July he wrote: 
All agitational work among the people 
must be reorganised to ensure that it takes 
account of the specific experience of the 
present revolution, and particularly the 
July days, ioe., that it clearly points to 
the real enemy of the people, the military 
clique? the Cadets and the Black Hundreds, 
and that it definitely unmasks the petty-
bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolution-
ary /basically a party of the peasantr~7 
and Menshevik parties, which played and are 
playing the part of butcher's aides. 
All agitational work among the people 
must be reorganised so as to make clear that 
it is absolutely hopeless to expect the peas-
ants to obtain land as long as the power of 
the military clique has not been overthrown, 
and as long as the Socialist-Revolutionary 
and Menshevik parties have not been exposed 
and deprived of the people's trust. That 
would be a very long and arduous process 
under the 11 normal 11 conditions of capital-
ist development, but both the war and eco-
nomic disruption will tremendously accel-
erate it. These are 11 accelerators 11 that 
may make a month or even a week equal to 
a year.74 
Here we see suggested the theory of 11 telescoping the 
73Lenin, Works Vol. 19, p. 419. 11 The Tasks of 
Agitation in the Present Situation, 11 a resolution of the 
Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee 
of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials. 
74 s Lenin, Works Vol. 25, p. 188. On logans, July, 
1917. 
91 
revolution" from a slightly different angle than was 
generally presented; in this case? the war and economic 
disruptions would speed up the natural process. But 
more important for our immediate point is Lenin's dis-
cussion of the task of depriving the various other revo-
lutionary parties, specifically the Menshevik and Social-
ist-Revolutionary parties 1 of the people's trust. The 
agitation would have to make it clear to the people 
that these parties were out to deceive them: exposure 
of these parties was necessaryo 
After the November (N.S.) Revolution had taken 
place, there erupted the civil war in Russia between the 
Red army and the 11 Whi te II army, between IJ.1rotsky, as 
commanding officer of the Communist forces, and Generals 
Kolchak and Deniken. This wa~ was fought to decide who 
would control the countryside--the revolution had al-
ready decided who would control the maJor cities. Dur-
ing the civil war the propagandists had yet another task: 
that of overcoming chaos and restoring order to the 
areas under Bolshevik control. On January 23, 1918 
(O.S.) Lenin gave a speech to a group of propagandists 
who were bound for the provinces. Pravda reported this 
speech on the following day. According to the Pravda 
account,, Lenin spoke? in relevant part, as follows: 
Chaos is our other enemy. It has to 
be fought with greater vigour now that the 
position of the Soviets has become stronger. 
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That struggle, comrades, is one you must pro-
mote. Great importance now attaches to your 
trip, the trip of prQPagandists from both 
government parties /the Bolsheviks and the 
Left Socialist-Revolutionaries7 now at the 
head of Soviet power. I believe that in the 
backwoods you will derive a great deal of 
satisfaction from persistent efforts to build 
up Soviet power and spread revolutionary ideas 
in the villages, eliminate the chaos and liber-
ate the toiling peasants from the village 
kulaks. 
0 G O • 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 • 0 0 0 e e e O • • • 
Comrades, you have before you some very 
difficult but, as I have said, satisfying 
work which boils down to getting the rural 
economy running and building up Soviet power. 
But you have assistants, for we know that 
every worker and peasant earning his own 
livelihood feels, deep down in his heart, 
that there is no salvation from famine and 
ruin but in Soviet power. We can save Rus-
sia.75 
Russia, it seems, was to be saved through the activities 
of the propagandists. 
Agitation: Practical Instructions 
On a few occasions Lenin gave specific instruc-
tions to the Party's professional persuaders. We may 
limit our discussion to agitation alone since Lenin sel-
dom gave advice or instruc~ion in the art of propaganda; 
what little he had to say about the actual practice of 
propaganda was said primarily in connection with the 
Party's newspapers. In such cases, his advice was simply 
to keep the newspaper at the level of propaganda, to not 
let it become another medium for agitation. It appears 
?5Lenin, Works Vol. 26, pp. 513-14. Pravda No. 18, 
Feb. 6 (Jan. 24), 1918. 
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that Lenin did not concern himself with the techniques 
of propaganda; he seems to have taken them entirely for 
granted, presumably because propaganda was what the 
party leaders did and they? apparently, needed no in-
struction. Furthermore? he did not seem to be actively 
grooming a second generation of revolutionary leaders. 
At least if he were? it is not apparent in his writings, 
so he did not have an opportunity to instruct in the 
techniques of propaganda in that regardo It seems to 
be almost entirely ignored as an important considera-
tionG However, Lenin was often concerned with agita-
tional techniques; he wrote much about the use of agi-
tation9 and sometimes about the proper way to conduct 
it, the sources for materials agitators should utilize, 
the proper line for the agitators to take, etc. 
In presenting an account of Lenin's instructions 
on the techniques of agitation, a maJor problem is that 
of organizing his writings on the subject. They seem to 
be, again, almost entirely ad hoc instructions 1 designed 
to help agitators overcome some particular problem. 
As a solution, we will simply present a number of spe-
cific instructions given by Lonin on a number of dif-
ferent Lhrou~hou~ hin rovolutlonnry caroor, 
keeping the examples typical and illustrative of his 
general concepts. 
First, one must keep in mind Lenin's notion of the 
dominant medium: agitation was to rely primarily on 
the spoken wordQ Also, one should remember the date--
the early part of the twentieth century--during which 
Lenin was most direc~ly concerned with agitation. At 
that time, of course, there were almost none of what we 
would call 11 mass media," and illiteracy was widespread 
in Russia, especially in the rural areas. Both of these 
factors probably dictated Lenin's prescription of media. 
The spoken word, at that time, could not be supplemented 
effectively by written materials, and had to rely on 
individual agitators present in the specific locale 
where agitation was to be conducted. Throughout his 
revolutionary career, Lenin upheld the dominance of the 
spoken word in agitation. In 1919, when addressing a 
plenary meeting of the All-Russia Central Council of 
Trade Unions, he referred to the "usual methods of agi-
tation--lectures, meetings, etc. • • G Ii He then pro-
posed additional measures, again primarily oral presen-
tations by individuals present at the encounter with 
the audience: "house-to-house 11 contacts, nd1stribution 
of leaflets and personal talks."76 Here we see that 
there was to be a legitimate role for written communi-
cations, but it was supplementary in nature. 
76Lenin, Works Vol. 29, Po 289. Report on the 
tasks of the trade unions in the mobilisation for the 
eastern front to the Plenary meeting of the All-Russia 
Central Council of Trade Unions, April 11, 1919. 
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Early in his career, Lenin indicated his awareness 
of a basic problem of communication which the agitator 
would face: that of using language which his audience 
would understando In 1899 he wrote "Apropos of the 
Profession de Foi 11 in which he referred to this problem: 
•• Q it is untrue that the masses will not 
understand the idea of political strugglee 
Even the most backward worker will under-
stand the idea? provided~ of course, the 
agitator or propagandist is able to approach 
him in such a way as to communicate the idea 
to him, to explain it in understandable lan-
guage on the basis of fact~ the worker knows 
from everyday experiencee7'1 
In light of later developments in Russia, and in light 
of Lenin 1 s later writings, the term "propagandist" ap-
pears unusual as used in this context. However, it must 
be remembered that at that early date the propagandists 
were those who were concerned with educating the worker 
circles. Later, the propagandists assumed a more insti-
tutionalized form, and contact with the workers was 
' generally an agitational, rather than a propagandistic 
one. The reasons for this were explained in connection 
with the origins of the definitions of the two terms, 
"agitation" and "propaganda." 
At any rate, Lenin sounded quite like a rhetorical 
theoretician in 1911 when he wrote concerning a specific 
slogan: 
77Lenin, Works Vol. 4, p. 291. "Apropos of the 




Wherever a Social-Democrat makes a poli-
tical speech, it is his duty always to speak 
of a republic. But one must know how to speak 
of a republico One cannot speak about it in 
the same terms when addressing a meeting in a 
factory and one in a Cossack village, when 
speaking at a meeting of students or in a 
peasant cottage, when it is dealt with from 
the rostrum of the Third Duma or in the col-
umns of a publication issued abroad. The art 
of any propagandist and agitator consists in 
his ability to find the best means of influenc-
ing any given audience, by presenting a definite 
truth in such a way as to make it most con-
vincing, most easy to digest, most graphic, 
and most strongly impressive.78 
Earlier, Karl Kautsky had written about the problem of 
audience adaptation, and Lenin appears to have obtained 
many of his ideas on the subJect from him. In 1899 
Lenin quoted Kautsky favorably in A Retrograde Trend in 
Russian Social-Democracy: 
"Tactics and agitation must not be confused, 11 
says Kautsky in his book against Bernstein. 
11Agitational methods must be adapted to indi-
vidual and local conditions. Every agitator 
must be allowed to select those methods of agi-
tation that he has at his disposal. One agita-
tor may create the greatest impression by his 
enthusiasm, another by his biting sarcasm, a 
third by his ability to adduce a large number 
of instances, etc. While being adapted to the 
agitator, agitation must also be adapted to the 
public. The agitator must speak so that he will 
be understood; he must take as a starting-point 
something well known to his listeners. All this 
is self-evident and is not merely applicable to 
agitation conducted among the peasantry. One 
has to talk to cabmen differently than to sail-
78Lenin, Works Volo 17, p., 341.' t'The Slogans and 
Organisation of Social-Democratic Work Inside and Out-
side the Duma, 11 Sotsial-Demokrat No. 25, Dec. 21 (8), 
1911. 
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ors, and to sailors differently than to printers. 
~itation must be individualised, but our tac-79 tics, our political activity must be uniform. 11 
Lenin often advised agitators to use examples taken 
from the locale in which they were conducting agitation. 
From Kautsky's book, it becomes clear that the examples 
were to be taken from the individual locality because 
these would be the ones most meaningful to the audience. 
Indeed, perhaps the local incidents would be the only 
ones even known, let alone meaningful, to the audience 
since the governmental censorship prevented news of dis-
turbances such as strikes from ever leaving the districts 
in which they occurred. However, Lenin believed that 
each locality would certainly provide a large number of 
examples from which to choose. In April, 1901, he 
wrote: 
The most common facts in the life of any Russian 
village provide a thousand issues for agitation 
in behalf of the above demandso This agitation 
must be based upon the local, concrete, and most 
pressing needs of the peasantry; yet it must not 
be confined to these needs, but must be steadily 
directed towards widening the outlook of the 
peasants, towards developing their political 
consciousnesso80 
In this article Lenin was discussing agitation among the 
peasantry, but the same advice applied to agitation 
79Lenin, Works Volo 4, p" 282. A Retrograde Trend 
in Russian Social-Democracy, written at the end of 1899, 
first published in 19240 
80Lenin, Works Volo 4, p. 425. nThe Workers' Party 
and the Peasantry, 11 written in February, 1901, published 
in Iskra No. 3, April, 1901. 
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among the proletariat: base the agitation on immediate 
local needs, but widen the scope at the same time. Poli-
tical consciousness was to be developed by agitation, 
by widening the rroutlookn of the masses to enable them 
to see the class struggle, not merely their own petty 
individual demandso A broader outlook could be accom-
plished by introducing political elements and political 
aspects to all economic questions: "Agitation on the 
basis of the direct and most urgent needs of the peasants 
will fulfil its purpose--ioeo, carry the class struggle 
into the countryside--only when it succeeds in combining 
every exposure of some 'economic' evil with definite 
political demands. 1181 
The central party would establish a program, a 
platform, which would enable the individual agitators to 
adapt to any given situation. The central organization 
would provide the principle~ the abstraction, the agi-
tators then had to make it concrete in their own locali-
ties. For example, Lenin thought that the agrarian pro-
gram of the Party~ established in 1902, provided 
a guiding principle that will enable any Social-
Democrat, even if he finds himself in some out-
of-the-way village, even if he is faced with 
the most tangled web of agrarian relationships 
which bring general democratic tasks into the 
81 Ibid. , p. Ll-26 o 
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foreground, to apply and stress his proletarian 
standpoint when he 1s tackling those tasks •. 
Guided by these principles of agrarian policy, 
any Russian Social-Democrat who finds himself 
in the countryside will be able to see his way 
in the intricate maze of relationships there, 
and will be able to 11 adapt 11 his strictly con-
sistent revolutionary pr9paganda and agitation 
to these relationships.83 
• • 
The principle was established by the Party, the indivi-
dual agitator was to apply ito 
Constant repetition seems to be a technique Lenin 
considered essential for effective agitation. When the 
Social Democrats were accused of 11 hammering away at the 
same slogans" Lenin thought 11 s1.1ch an accusation a com-
pliment. ~or it is plainly our task to hammer away per-
sistently at vital political slogans, while spreading 
82 
the general truths of the Social-Democratic programme. 1184 
Another technique he favored was constant study of 
the enemy, to provide material for agitation. 
For agitation among the masses, the study 
of extracts from the speeches of Shidlovsky, 
Bobrinsky, Lvov, Golitsyn, Kapustin and Co. is 
absolutely necessary. Up till now we have seen 
the autocracy almost exclusively when it was 
giving orders, and sometimes, rarely, publishing 
82Lenin, Works Volb 6, p. 125. The Agrarian Pro-
gramme of Russian Social-Democracy, written in :B'ebruary 
and March, 1902, published in August, 1902. 
83Ibido, Po 149. 
84Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 222. 11 In the Wake of the 
Monarchist Bourgeoisie, or in the Van of the Revolution-
ary Proletariat and Peasantry?, 11 Proletary No. 15, Sept. 
5 (Aug. 23), 1905 . . • 
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statements in the spirit of Ugryum-Burcheyev 
La dull-minded fictional character7. Now we 
nave ~he open defence of the landlord monarchy 
and the Black-Hundred 11 constitution 11 by the 
organised representatives of the ruling classes, 
and this defence provides very valuable material 
for the awakening of those sections of the 
people who8~re politically unconscious or in-different. 7 
Quotations taken from non-Bolsheviks? also, would often 
prove helpful. During the civil war, on July 9, 1919, 
Lenin advised agitators to explain that the alternative 
was either 11 Kolchak and Denikin or Soviet power, the 
power (dictatorship) of the workers. 11 He counseled the 
use of "testimony of non-Bolshevik eyewitnesses, of Men-
sheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and non-party people 
who have been in the areas overrun by Kolchak or Deni-
kin. u86 
The above are some of the instructions given by 
Lenin, on various occasions, to revolutionary agitators. 
As a general rule, however? Lenin was more concerned 
about higher level abstractions than about specific 
instructions to agitators to govern their day-to-day 
affairs~ 
85Lenin, Works Volo 15 9 p. 305. 11 The Agrarian 
Debates in the Third Duma, 11 Proletary No. 40, Dec. 14 
(1), 19080 
86Lenin, Works Vol. 29, Po 439. "All Out for the 
Fight Against Denikin!~ 11 letter of the Central Committee 
of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) to party 
organizations, Bulletin of the Central Committee, 
RCP(B), No. 4, July 9, 1919-. -
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Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed the two central 
concepts of persuasion: agitation and propaganda. Both 
terms had a significant history prior to Lenin's appear-
ance as an active revolutionary. Propaganda was a long-
range activity, primarily educational in nature, con-
ducted within the worker circles. The propagandists 
sought to teach the workers vari'ous subJects ranging 
from simple literacy to political science and economics, 
and usually they attached their own party lines. 
Agitation originated in Poland among the Union of 
Polish Workers. It was found that greater immediate 
success could be obtained by inflaming the workers to 
take some overt action, usually to stage a strike. To 
gain wider acceptance of agitation as a method, Kremer 
wrote a pamphlet, On Agitation~ some copies of which 
were taken into Russia. Kremer's work was the form in 
which Lenin first contacted agitation as a persuasive 
method. Agitation was conceived as dealing strictly 
with economic demands of the workers. 
Lenin opposed the concept of agitation at first. 
Following his term of exile, however, he revised both 
concepts, and accepted both as necessary. In 1902 
Is To Be Done? appeared, in which Lenin set forth his 
definitions for the two terms. Agitation was defined as 
a method of persuasion directed toward the masses., Con-
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sequently, the agitator took one idea and illustrated 
it. Propaganda, on the other hand, was the method of 
persuasion directed toward the intellectual elite. Con-
sequently, the propagandist took many ideas and presented 
them as a systematic theoryQ The agitator was to use 
primarily the spoken word, the propagandist the written 
word. 
Both methods of persuasion had one overall goal: 
the education of the proletariat. Lenin believed the 
masses of workers were ignorant of their true class 
interests. He also believed that if the proletariat 
were simply shown their true class interests, their true 
long-range interests, and the true relation of their 
problems to other classes in Russian society, they would 
at once recognize that truth and adopt it as their be-
lief systemQ In other words, Lenin thought that if the 
proletariat were simply shown the Marxist truth, they 
would become class conscious and therefore revolution-
ary. Thus, persuasion was designed to educate the masses 
to see their real class interestso 
However, there were also a number of specific tasks 
that agitation and propaganda were to accomplish, and 
several of these were discussed. Through persuasion, 
the support for the Party was to be increased, and so-
cialist ideas were to be eminated. The masses were 
to gain an understanding of absolutism in all its mani-
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festationsQ 
On a number of occasions Lenin offered instructions 
or recommendations on the art of agitationo Basically, 
his advice was simply that the agitator adapt to his 
audience in all necessary wayso He recommended that 
examples be used, particularly examples drawn from the 
locale in which the agitation was being conducted. Rep-
etition was another tactic of which Lenin approved. 
Observation of the enemy~ the bourgeoisie, could be a 
valuable source of material for agitation. 
In general, Lenin placed great tasks on persuasion 
as a revolutionary strategy. If the Party's persuasive 
attempts were unsuccessful, the masses would not become 
educated, would not develop class consciousness. Then 
the Party would remain a group of a few intellectuals 
alienated from the rest of society. If the Social Demo-
cratic Party were to lead the masses, the masses had to 




Slogans played a most important role in Lenin's 
concept of agitation and propagandaQ In fact, from 
1905 on much of his writing on the subject of persuasion 
dealt either with the topic of slogans generally or with 
a specific slogan. The Bolsheviks' slogans seem to have 
been an important factor in their success in November, 
1917 (N.S.)o Tne Russian historian Vernadsky attributed 
the strength of the Bolsheviks to "the force of their 
slogans and the efficiency of their organization. 111 
Certainly Lenin believed that correct slogans were nec-
essary for success. In this chapter, then, we will dis-
cuss Lenin's concept of slogans and their use. We will 
consider four different aspects of our subject: 1) the 
creation of slogans, 2) ~he functions of slogans, 3) 
phrase mongering, or incorrect slogans, and 4) the im-
portance of sloganso 
Lenin never offered a definition of the term "slo-
gan," but perhaps by considering his methods of creating 
1George Vernadsk¥, A History of Russia (New York: 
New Home Library, 1944), p. 244. 
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correct slogans, his prescriptions for finding and se-
lecting slogans to advance, the concept may become more 
clear. For Lenin, a correct slogan was not simply a 
catchy phrase used to win elections. It was not some-
thing which one would hire an advertising firm to write. 
A correct slogan had to be based on the realities of the 
political, econornic 9 and social forces operative at the 
time the slogan was to be advanced. "Every particular 
slogan must be deduced from the totality of specific 
features of a definite political situation. 112 Basically, 
a slogan was considered to be the summary of the entire 
program, or the important points of the program, of a 
political party. From an analysis of a slogan 9 one 
could determine what class interests dominated the party 
advancing that slogan. Naturally, Lenin's theoretical 
basis for the criticism of slogans was his brand of 
Marxism. He always asked what class interests a slogan 
contained or represented, but he asked it from a social-
ist point of view. However, the point remains that a 
correct slogan had to be based on the active forces in 
a society; for Lenin it could not be ot::·J:::;:.·,.:..se~ Thus, 
one had to analyze the active forces within the given 
society before one could decide what slogans would be 
proper to advance his class interests. As Lenin stated 
2Lenin, Works Vol. 25, p. 183. On Slogans, July, 
1917. 
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-in the concrete situation of the 1905 revolution: 11 In 
its social and economic essence, the democratic revo-
lution in Russia is a bourgeois revolution. It is, how-
ever, not enough merely to repeat this correct Marxist 
propositiono It has to be properly understood and prop-
erly applied to political sloganso 11 3 
Indeed, not only were class interests involved in 
the presentation of specific slogans, they were also 
involved in the absence of specific slogans. Lenin con-
tended, again during the 1905 revolution, that "one must 
know what real political forces profit by the tactical 
slogans advanced--or perhaps by the absence of certain 
slogans. 114 The latter consideration Lenin used primarily 
as an aid in analyzing proposed slogans. When a slogan 
appeared correct from a positive analysis, answering the 
question, 11 What class will benefit from this slogan?" 
~enin then applied a negative analysis, answering the 
question, "What class will benefit if this slogan is not 
advanced?" 
Political, social, and economic forces active at 
the time had to be analyzed be.fore a slogan could be 
chosen or Judged. The correct slogan would be implicit 
in the situabion. One test of the correctness of a 
3Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 111. Two Tactics of 
Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, July, 
1905. - -
4Ibid. , p. 105. 
107 
slogan was whe-cher it merely obtained strength by being 
a 11 decree from above" by the top Party hierarchy, or 
whether it obtained its strength 11 from the conviction of 
the revolutionary workers themselveso 11 5 One could not 
simply ask what forces were active; one also had to 
decide whether a specific demand was contained implicitly 
? 
in the proletariat as it was affected by the active 
forces. 
Perhaps greater clarity can be obtained by pre-
senting several examples of Lenin's analyses of specific 
slogans. In 1913 Lenin wrote Theses _QQ the National 
Question in which he confronted the slogan of "cultural-
national autonomy": 
The Social-Democratic attitude to the slo-
gan of 11 cultural-national" (or simply "national") 
"autonomy" or to plans for its implementation is 
a negative one, since this slogan (1) undoubtedly 
contradicts the internationalism of the class 
struggle of the proletariat, (2) makes it easier 
for the proletariat and the masses of working 
people to be drawn into the sphere o~ influence 
of bourgeois nationalism? and (3) is capable of 
distracting attention from the task of the con-
sistent democratic transformation of the state 
as a whole, which transformation alone can en-
sure (to the extent that this can, in general, 
be ensured ugder capitalism) peace between na-
tionalities. 
5Lenin, Works Vol. 18, pp. 111-120 "The Slogans 
of the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Jan-
uary, 1912 and the May Day Movement, 11 Sotsial-Demokrat 
No. 27, June 17 (4), 1912. Italics here and throughout 
the chapter are in the original. 
6Len1n, Works Vol. 19, p. 246. Theses on the 
National Question, June, 1913, first publishedin 1925. 
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In analyzing this slogan, Lenin took into consideration 
not only the theory of internationalism, but the actual 
force or nationalism. Due to the latter, the slogan 
was rejectedo In other words, for Lenin a slogan did 
not exist in a vacuum, but inevitably advanced certain 
interests and retarded others. Upon analysis of the 
affected interests rested the acceptance or rejection 
of a given slogano 
For a second example, we may consider the 1905 
revolution and the slogan of a 11 consti tuent assembly •11 
Lenin considered the conditions necessary for such an 
assembly and the consequent necessary amendments to the 
slogan: 
To establish a new order rtthat will really ex-
press the will of the people 11 it is not enough 
to term a representative assembly a constituent 
assembly. Such an assembly must have the author-
ity and power to 11 constitut.§_ 11 o Conscious of 
this the iThird7 Congress iof the R.S.D.L.P~7 
resolution does not confine itself to the formal 
slogan of a 11 constituent assembly 11 , but adds the 
material conditions which alone will enable such 
an assembly to carry out its task properly. 
Tnis specification of the conditions enabling 
an assembly that is constituent in name to be-
come one in fact is imperatively necessary, for, 
as we have more than once pointed out, the 
liberal bourgeoisie, as represented by the 
Constitutional-Monarchist Party, is deliber-
ately distorting the slogan of a popular con-
stituent assembly, and reducing it to a hollow 
phrase."! 
In tnis case, Lenin's Party had analyzed the conditions 
?Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 26. Two Tactics of Social-
Democracy 2:,g the Democratic Revolution"; July, 1905. 
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necessary for a truly 11 constituent 11 assembly and included 
them along with the central goal as conditions to work 
for and demands to be met. Again, knowledge and analy-
sis of the forces within the society was needed before 
a slogan could be correct; otherwise, it would remain 
a mere "hollow phrase. 11 
In other cases, also, Lenin thought that additional 
conditions were necessary for a slogan to be correct. 
For example, during the First World War Lenin advocated 
11 Peace 11 as a slogan. However, he was not a pacifist. 
Thus, he analyzed 11 Peace" as a slogan as follows: 
The peace slogan can be advanced either 
in connection with definite peace terms, or 
without any conditions at all, as a struggle, 
not for a defini~e kind of peace, but for peace 
in general .. o • In the latter case, we 
obviously have a slogan that is not only non-
socialis~ but entirely devoid of meaning and 
content. 
In such a case, additional terms would have to be added 
to the slogan to give it meaningo 
As a final example, let us take Lenin's analysis 
of the famous slogan, 11 All Power to the Soviets, 11 in 
1917. This, of course, was the slogan he advanced shortly 
after returning to Russia in April. However, by July 
he no longer liked the people and parties in control of 
the Soviets, so he abandoned the slogan. He was to take 
it up again in October, but the analysis to be quoted 
8Lenin, Works Vol~ 21, p. 290. The Question of 
Peace, written, July-August, 1915, first published,1924. 
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here was written in July, 1917: 
The slogan calling for the transfer of 
state power ~o tne Soviets would now sound 
quixotic or mockingo ObJectively it would 
be deceiving the people; it would be foster-
ing in them the delusion that even now it is 
enough for the Soviets to want to take power, 
or to pass such a decision, for power to be 
theirs, that there are still parties in the 
Soviets which have not been tainted by abetting 
the butchers, that it is possible to undo 
what has been done.9 
The substitution of the abstract for 
the concrete is one of the greatest and 
most dangerous sins in a revolution. The 
present Soviets have failed, have suffered 
complete defeat, because they are dominated 
by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik 
parties. At the moment these Soviets are 
like sheep brought to the slaugnter-house 
and bleating pitifully under the knifeo The 
Soviets at present are powerless and helpless 
against tne triumphant and triumphing counter-
revolutiono The slogan calling for the trans-
fer of power to the Soviets migh~ be construed 
as a 11 simple" appeal for the transfer of power 
to the present Soviets, and to say that, to 
appeal for it, would now mean deceiving the 
people. Nothing is more dangerous than de-
ceit.10 
Attempting to justify an abrupt shift of slogans, he 
appealed to an abrupt shift of forces. After the Bol-
sheviks had obtained a maJority in the Soviets, natural-
ly, he again advocated transfer of 11 All Power to the 
Soviets. 11 
1917. 
The second aspect of slogans to be considered is 
9Lenin, Works Vol. 25, p. 185. 
10 Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
On Slogans, July, 
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the functions they were to perform in the revolution. 
In Lenin's writings three primary functions stand out. 
First, a slogan was to be used to gain the attention of 
an audience. Gaining attention seems to have been par-
ticularly important in relation to the peasantry. Since 
the Social Democratic Party professed to be a party of 
the proletariat, the peasantry could not be much involved. 
Yet, since the Russian population was predominantly 
peasant, the Social Democrats could not ignore them. So, 
the programs of the Bolsheviks always included a section 
on agrarian problems. To draw the attention of the 
peasants to what the Social Democrats proposed to do for 
them, Lenin advocated the use of a slogan: "The prac-
tical demands and slogans, or, more pr9perly, the pro-
posals that have to be made to gain the attention of 
the peasants, should be based on vital and urgent is-
sues.1111 
Following the same analysis, Lenin advocated the 
use of a slogan at the end of the Social Democratic 
election platform. Such a slogan would be a "watchword" 
for the election campaign, "stating the most cardinal 
issues of current political practice, and providing a 
most convenient and most immediate pretext, as well as 
11Lenin, Works Vol. 24, p. 168. "Congress of 
Peasants' Deputies, 11 Pravda No. 34, April 29 (16), 1917. 
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subJect matter, for comprehensive socialist propagan-
a.~ 1112 a. The use of a 11 watchword 11 seems closely related 
to the use of a slogan to gain the attention of an au-
dience, but it included the additional function of keep-
ing the attention of the propagandist or agitator focused 
on the maJOr issueso 
A second function slogans were to perform was that 
of leading the masseso Lenin even argued that without 
slogans to lead the masses, the masses possibly would 
not be led. In 1905, during the first Russian revolu-
tion, he wrote: "It is exceptionally important at the 
present time for Social-Democrats to have correct tacti-
cal slogans for leading the masses. There is nothing 
more dangerous in a revolutionary period than belittling 
the importance of tactical slogans that are sound in 
principle" 1113 
Later in 1905 he expanded on his claim that the 
slogans of the Bolsheviks must guide the masses. The 
slogans, he contended, must not 11 limp behind events, 11 
being merely 11 adapted to events after their occurrence. 11 
The slogans must 11 lead us forward, light up the path 
before us, and raise us above the immediate tasks of the 
12Lenin,, Works VoL, 17, po 28L. "The Election Cam-
paign and the Election Platform," Sotsial-Demokrat No. 
24, October 31 (18), 1911~ 
13Lenin, Works Vole 9, Po 19" T\vO Tactics of So-
cial-Democracy~ the Democratic Revolution, July, 1905. 
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moment. 11 The slogans must provide a steady, constant, 
stable point around which the everyday tasks could be 
done; otherwise it would be impossible to nwage a con-
sistent and sustained struggle 11 on the part of the pro-
letariat, for the Party could not 11 determine its tactics 
from occasion to occasion" and maintain consistency. 14 
In other words, the slogans must guide not only the 
masses but the Party members as well, enabling them to 
meet various situations in a consistent manner. In the 
latter sense, the second function of slogans was quite 
closely related to the first functiono 
An outstanding example of the second function of 
slogans, leading the masses~ occurred in 1912 when the 
police arrested a large number of the more important 
Social Democrats and labor leaders in St. Petersburg, 
shattering the labor organization. However, a few re-
maining Social Democrats were seemingly able to re-
establish the organization quite rapidly because the 
Social Democrats 1 slogans had led the masses and had 
been acceptedo The Social Democrats who 
es, 11 
had lost their guiding centre, re-established 
contact with all the various groups by winning 
over workers regardless of the views they held 
and advocating to }hem all their Party slogans. 
And precisely because these Party slogans are 
correct, because they are in keeping with the 
proletariat's revolutionary tasks and comprise 
14Lenin, Works Volo 9, p. 153. 11 Revolution Teach-
Proletary No. 9, July 26 (13), 1905. 
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che tasks of a revolution of the whole people, 
they were accepted by all workerscl5 
In 1915, also, Lenin discussed the leadership 
function of slogans: ''The appalling misery of the mass-
es, which has been created by the war, cannot fail to 
evoke revolutionary sentiments and movementso The civil 
war slogan must serve to co-ordinate and direct such 
sentiments and movementso 1116 
A third function of slogans was to clearly differ-
entiate for the masses the various parties. Specifi-
cally, Lenin warned that the Bolshevik faction of the 
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party would have to make 
certain that its slogans were such as to set it apart 
from all other parties and from all other classes than 
, the proletariat. On a number of occasions Lenin con-
demned the continued use of a slogan which the Bolsheviks 
had previously advanced simply because one of the bour-
geois parties had adopted the same slogan. Lenin al-
ways maintained that: 
Slogans must be brou5ht forward so as to en-
able the masses, through propaganda and agi-
tation, to see the unbridgeable distinction 
between socialism and capitalism (imperial-
ism), and not for the purpose of reconciling 
l5Lenin, Works Vol., 18, p .. 113.. ''The Slogans of 
the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January, 
1912 and the May Day Movement," botsial-Demokrat No. 27, 
June 17 (4), 19120 
16 Lenin, Works Vol. 21, p. 160~ "The Conference 
of the R.S.D.L .. 1->. Groups Abroad, 11 Sotsinl-Demokrat No. 
40, March 29 (16), 19150 
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two hostile classes and two hostile political 
lines, with the aid of a formula that "unites" 
the most different thingsol7 
Perhaps a few examples will best clarify Lenin's 
thoughto In 1905, during the revolution, Lenin proposed 
two slogans for the Social Democrats: 
To advance the revolution, to take it beyond 
the limits to which the monarchist bourgeoisie 
advances it, it is necessary actively to pro-
duce, emphasise, and bring into the forefront 
slogans that will preclude the "inconsistency 11 
of bourgeois democracy. At present there are 
only two such slogans: 1) a provisional rev-
olutionary government, and 2) a republic, be-
cause the slogan of a popular constituent as-
sembly has been accepted by the monarchist 
bourgeoisie""""(see the programme of the Osvo-
bozhdeniye League) and accepted for the very 
purpose of devitalising the revolution~ pre-
venting its complete victory, and enabling 
the big bourgeoisie t£8strike a huckster's bargain with tsarism. 
In this case, we can discern two functions of the slogans 
advocated: 1) they must lead the masses, or, as Lenin 
' put it, "advance the revolution 9 11 and 2) they must 
clearly differentiate the Social Democrats from the 
bourgeoisie, in this case specifically the Osvobozhdeniye 
League, which, led by Peter Struve, was the nucleus 
that eventually formed the Cadet Partya 
A year later, in 1906, Lenin contested thG r:.1·1•n,sal 
l?Lenin, Works Vol. 21, pp. 290-91. The Question 
of Peace, written July-August, 1915, first published, 
1924-. 
18 Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 4-5. Two Tactics of 
Social-Democracy l:!!. the Democratic Revolution, July, 
1905. 
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to advance the slogan? 11 a responsible ministry Q 11 We 
have already mentioned the controversy which arose con-
cerning the czarist ministry. It will be remembered 
that the ministers were responsible only to the czar, 
and that some liberals advocated adoption of a ministry 
responsible to, hence removable by, the Duma or parlia-
ment. It will also be remembered that the Bolsheviks 
were suspicious of this proposal. Lenin took issue with 
a resolution proposing the slogan 9 "substitute for the 
present Ministry a Ministry appointed by the Duma. 11 
This slogan is ambiguous. It confuses the 
minds of the proletariat. For the Cadets 
use the demand for a Duma Ministry as a 
screen to hide their desire to strike a 
bargain with the autocratic government and 
to weaken the revolution, to hamper the 
convocation of a constituent assembly.19 
He did not want the possibility to exist of confusing 
the Bolsneviks with even so liberal a party as the Men-
sheviks, let alone the Cadetsg 
As .a final example? we may turn to the slogan, 
11 confiscation of the landed estates, 11 which Lenin advo-
cated in 1911. His analysis of this slogan concluded 
that it was a desirable one: 
At a time when the Russian villages never 
cease groaning under the burden of the Sto-
lypin 11 re.form 11 , when an extremely .fierce 
struggle is going on between the mass of the 
population on the one hand and the "new land-
19Lenin, Works Vol. 10, p. 483. 11 The Slogan of a 
Duma Ministry, 11 Vperyocl No. 2, June 9 (May 27), 1906. 
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owners 11 and the rural police on the other, 
and when, according to the testimony of ex-
tremely conservative people hostile to the 
revolution, bitterness such as has never 
before been seen is making itself felt ever 
more strongly--at such a time the demand 
must be made a central plank of the whole 
democratic election platEormo We shall only 
point out that this is the very demand that 
will draw a clear line of demarcation be-
tween consistent proletarian democracy and 
not only the landlord liberalism of the Ca-
dets, but also the intellectual-bureaucratic 
talk about "standards", "consumption stan-
dards11, 11 product1on standards 11 , 11 equalitarian 
distribution 11 , and similar nonsense, of which 
the Narodniks are so fondA and at which every 
sensible peasant laughs.2u 
Here again, the maJor advantage presented for the pro-
posed slogan was that it would clearly differentiate the 
Social Democrats from all other groups which were seek-
ing the support of the peasantryo It is clear, then, 
that a major function of the Party's slogans was to be 
the clear differentiation of the Party from all other 
political groups in Russiao 
Of course, not everyone agreed with Lenin in his 
analysis of specific slogans; not everyone held the same 
convictions about specific slogans to advance. The 
parties representing classes other than the proletariat 
naturally often disagreed entirely with Lenin's conclu-
sions and standards. When such people proposed their 
own slogans, Lenin labeled them 11 phrase-mongers, 11 and 
20Lenin, Works Vol. 17, p. 284. 11 The Election 
Campaign and the Election Platform, 11 Sotsial-Demokrat 
No. 24, October 31 (18), 1911. 
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their activity 9 11 phrase-mongeringo 11 In general, the 
term 11 phrase 11 referred to any slogan incorrect from the 
Marxist point of view. For example, in 1918 Lenin wrote 
an article entitled ''The Revolutionary Phrase 11 devoted 
to the subJect of incorrect slogans. At other times, 
he referred to an incorrect slogan as a 11 hollow phrase" 
or as a 11 mere phraseo 11 Lenin defined "revolutionary 
phrase making" or 1'phrase-mongering 11 as the "repetition 
of revolutionary slogans irrespective of objective 
circumstances at a given turn in events, in the given 
state of affairs obtaining at the time. 1121 
One common type of 11 phrase-mongering 11 which Lenin 
warned against was the use of 11 some I charming' terms 
.from the out1,rnr·n past • • • to conceal the tasks of the 
future. In such cases the charm of a term which has al-
ready played its part in history becomes so much useless 
and harmful tinsel, a child's rattle. 1122 Social Demo-
crats had to be careful not to .fall into the mistake of 
using historical slogans simply because they were his-
torical. Lenin cautioned: 
••• it is Just because we cherish this con-
cern .for revolutionary traditions that we must 
vigorously protest against the view that by 
using one of the slo8ans of a particular his-
21Lenin, Works Vol. 27, p. 19. uThe Revolutionary 
Phrase, 11 Pravda No. 31, :B1 ebruary 21, 1918. 
22Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 800 Two Tactics of 
,Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, July, 
1905. 
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torical period the essential conditions of that 
period can be restored. It is one thing to 
preserve the traditions of the revolution, to 
know how to use them for constant propaganda 
and agi~ation and for acquainting the masses 
with the conditions of a direct and aggressive 
struggle against the old regime, but quite 
another thing to repeat a slogan divorced from 
the sum total of the conditions which gave 
rise to it and which ensured its success and 
to appl~ it to essentially different condi-
tionso2;.i 
"Phrase-mongering" was an activity especially en-
gaged in by the bourgeois parties. In fact, Lenin be-
lieved that 11 one of the manifestations of the traces of 
the petty-bourgeois spirit is surrender to revolutionary 
phrases. 1124 Since the bourgeoisie did not, and indeed 
could not, have proletarian in~erests foremost, they 
were bound to be less revolutionary in Lenin's eyes. 
Their lesser zeal for revolution became evident in the 
bourgeoisie's slogans: "But bourgeois democracy always 
drags at the tail of events; while adopting more ad-
vanced slogans, it always lags behind; it always formu-
lates the slogans several degrees below the level really 
required in the real revolutionary struggle for real 
liberty. 1125 Consequently, the slogans advanced by the 
23Lenin, Works Volo 13, pp. 39-40. Against Boy-
cott, '1907. 
24Lenin, Works Vol. 27, p. 28. 11 The Revolutionary 
Phrase, 11 Pravda J\Jo. 31, February 21, 1918. 
25Lenin, Works Vol. 8, p. 513.. "The Democratic 
Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat, 11 Proletary No. 
4, June 17 (4), 1905c 
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bourgeoisie had, Lenin believed, two important character-
istics: they were vague? incomplete and non-committal; 
and they were attempts to turn the proletarian slogans 
into 11 mere phrases, to substitute empty promises for 
real safeguards of liberty and revolution. 1126 In short, 
the bourgeoisie were 11 phrase-mongers. 11 
A couple of examples of Lenin's analyses of mon-
gered phrases may aid in clarification of the concept. 
In 1915 he denounced the slogan calling for peace as 
one which nwould mean encouraging pompous airs of impo-
tent (and frequently what is worse: hypocritical) 
phrase-mongers; it would mean deceiving the people with 
illusion that the existing governments, the present-day 
master classes are canable" of granting peace acceptable 
to the working class without first being eliminated. 
Lenin believed that the deception which would result 
from the peace slogan would be extremely harmful. It 
would -chrow 11 dust in the eyes of the workers II and prevent 
them from seeing the "deep contradictions between cap-
italism and socialism. o •• 1127 Such a phrase would 
have to be rejected. 
In 1905 the Cadets advanced a slogan calling for 
26Ibid., p. 517. 
27Lenin, Works Vol. 21, p. 292. The Question of 
Peace, written July-August, 1915, first published, 
1924. 
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11 revolutionary communes o II However, Lenin thought this 
phrase had no content: 
\rvhat is meant by nrevolutionary communes 11 ? 
Does this concept differ from 11 a provisional 
revolutionary government 11 ? and, if so, in 
what respect? The gentlemen of the Con-
ference do not know themselves. Confusion 
of revolutionary thought leads them, as 
very often 18nappens, to revolutionary Dhrase-mongerinv,.2 
In 1908 during the reaction to the 1905 revolution 
Lenin carried his analysis of the effects of 11 confusion 
of revolutionary thought 11 .further, concluding that the 
revolutionary must understand his own slogans completely: 
These people /Socialist-Revolutionaries7 
have learned Q.;Y_ heart the 11 slogan11 of armed 
uprising, without having understood the 
meaning of this slogan or its applicability. 
That is why, after the first defeats of the 
revolution they so lightly throw aside their 
ill-digested slogans, taken on trust. Whereas 
if these people valued Marxism as the only 
revolutionary theory of the twentieth century, 
if they had studied the history of the Rus-
sian revolutionary movement, they would have 
seen the difference between phrase-mongering 
and the development of really revolutionary 
slogans. The Social-Democrats did not put 
forward the 11 slogan 11 of insurrection either 
in 1901, when the demonstrations caused 
Krichevsky and Martynov to begin shouting 
about 11 the assault 11 , or in 1902 and 1903, 
when the late Nadezhdin called the plan of 
the old Iskra riliterary exercises". They 
put forward the slogan of insurrection only 
after January 9, 1905, when not a single per-
son could doubt any longer thot a general 
political crisis had broken out, that it was 
growing more acute daily and hourly, by the 
28 Lenin, Works Vol. 9, p. 80. Two Tactics of 
Social-Democracy~ the Democratic Revolution, July, 
1905. 
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direct movement of the masses. And within a 
few months this crisis led to insurrection.29 
Insufficient understanding of the content of a slogan, 
Lenin thought, would often lead to mere rrphrase-monger-
ing. tr 
Even with the danger of 11 phrase-mongering,tr Lenin 
maintained that slogans were crucial for the revolution. 
He seems to have obtained his initial concept of the 
importance o~ slogans from Karl Marx himself. In 1894 
Lenin referred to a work by Marx in which the latter 
wrote that the function of a communist was to provide 
the world "with a true slogan of struggle. We only show 
the world what it is actually struggling for, and con-
sciousness is a thing which the world must acquire, 
whether it likes it or not. 1130 The most important 
theoretician of Social Democracy, in other words, had 
claimed that slogans were important; his disciple quite 
understandably accepted the claim. 
Modern analysis of propaganda also recognizes the 
importance of slogans. Lasswell has written that a 
"strong presumption of effectiveness exists, for instance, 
when investigation demonstrates the degree to which 
29Lenin, Works Vol. 15, p. 153. nsome Features of 
the Present Oollapse,u Proletary No. 32, July 15 (2), 
1908. 
30 Lenin, Works Vol. 1, pp. 184-85. 





propaganda phrases are taken over by 'target audien-
ces.•n31 A similar methodological assumption seems to 
have been made by Lenin, for he often referred to the 
success of Social Democratic agitation as indicated by 
the acceptance of a slogan by the masseso For example, 
in 1911, Lenin advocated adoption of a new slogan calling 
for a republic. Apparently his proposal met with some 
opposition? to which he replied: 
•• a let no one try to tell us that the 
slogan calling for a republic-does not apply 
to the present stage of the political devel-
opment of the workers and peasants. About 
ten or twelve years ago there were not only 
some Narodniks who would not dare even to 
think of the slogan, "Down with the autocra-
cyn, but even certain Social-Democrats, the 
so-called Economists, opposed that slogan 
as being inopportune. Yet by 1903-04 the 
slogan, "Down with the autocracy", had be-
come a "household word 11 132 
One standard by which he judged the correctness of this, 
as of other slogans, was its accepwance after-the-fact. 
There obviously were other standards which were con-
sidered, for example, those we have discussed as bearing 
on the development of new slogans, but the only standard 
for the success of a slogan was its acceptance by the 
masses. 
31Harold D. Lasswell, introduction to Karin 
Dovring, Road of Propaganda (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1959), Po lo 
32Lenin, Works Vol. 17, pp. 337-38. "The Slogans 
and Organisation of Social-Democratic Work Inside and Out-
side the Duma, 0 Sotsial-Demokraw No. 25, Dec. 21 (8), 
1911. 
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We have already referred to the 1912 arrests in St. 
Petersburg which would have destroyed Social Democratic 
activity in that city, Lenin believed, but for the exist-
ence of Social Democracy's correct slogans, which not 
only provided a guide for the proletarians of that city, 
but also a rallying point around which the St. Peters-
burg workers became united. In this case, also, accept-
ability and correctness were, for him, two sides of the 
same coino 
Later in 1912 Lenin felt that the decisions of a 
recent Social Democratic conference had been successful, 
basing his belief on the acceptance of the Party's slo-
gans adopted by that conference: 
In the six months since the Conference, 
work has been going on through the Party press 
and dozens of reports, in hundreds of speeches 
in factory groups and at the meetings held in 
April and May, to explain the Conference de-
cisions and to put them into effect. The 
Party's slogans--a republic, an eight-hour 
working day, confiscation of the landed es-
tates--have spread throughout Russia and have 
been accepted by the foremost proletarians. 
The revolutionary upsurge of the masses, its 
expression ranging from strikes and meetings 
to revolts in the armed forces, have proved 
these slogans to be correct and vita1.33 
After the Bolshevik Revolution had succeeded in 
the maJor cities, it was carried, in the form of a 
bloody civil war, to the countryside. Finally the 
33Lenin, Works Vol. 18, p. 237. 11 0n the Eve of 
the Elections to the Fourth Duma," Rabochaya Gazeta 
No. 9, Aug. 12 (July 30), 1912. 
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Bolsheviks controlled all of Russia. E~logizing the 
results of the civil war, Lenin attributed much of the 
Bolsheviks' success to tne acceptance of their slogans. 
He reported to the Communist Party: 
••• everywhere we achieved victory with 
extraordinary ease precisely because the 
fruit had ripened, because the masses had 
already gone through the experience of 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Our 
slogan 11 All Power to the Soviets", which 
the masses had tested in practice by long 
historical experience,_had become part of 
their flesh and blood.34 
Lenin, then, believed successful slogans to be crucial 
for successful revolution. And he believed the success 
of a slogan depended on the extent of its acceptance. 
The slogan, apparently, occupied a central position 
in Lenin's concept of agitation. A slogan was, in 
effect, a summary of the entire Social Democratic Party 
position, or a significant portion of it. A slogan 
focused both the agitator's and the audience's attention 
on the issues of the era, and helped them maintain a 
consistent position under all circumstances. In doing 
so, the slogans represented, and advanced, certain class 
interests. Therefore, all forces operative at a given 
moment had to be analyzed before a slogan could be ad-
vanced. Once advanced, the slogan, if successful, 
34 Lenin? Works Volo 27, p. 890 "Political Report 
of the Central Committee, March 7, 1918, to the Extra-
ordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) 11 
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would be accepted by the masses and guide t~em in or 
toward the revolution. 
CHAPTER V 
PARTY ORGANIZATION AND MEDIA 
Lenin's concern for persuasion as a revolutionary 
strategy led him to deal not only with the central con-
cepts of persuasion which have been covered in the last 
three chapters, but also with a number of issues, while 
somewhat tangential to persuasion, nevertheless related 
to it. This study has sought to focus on the central 
issues, the concepts of agitation and propaganda, and 
the topic of sloga~s. However, two of the other areas 
are important and must be considered briefly here: 1) 
the organizational structure of the Party and 2) the 
media for persuasiono 
The organizational issue must be considered since 
it was crucial in Lenin's thought. As is well known, 
it was primarily over the question of the organization 
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party that the 
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks split at the 1903 Party 
Congress. The Bolsheviks, under the leadership of 
Lenin, advocated a Party of the elite among revolution-
aries, small in membership, and highly centralized. The 




with almost open membership, and little central control 
over the members. Lenin's view, of course 7 prevailed, 
at least after 1917; and even today the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union seems to be limited in membership 
to relatively few among the entire populationo 
Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion of 
Lenin's concepts of organization as they relate to his 
theory of persuasion would be with a brief overview, a 
few generalizations about Lenin's beliefs. Later, then, 
they will be discussed in more depth. One cannot help 
but notice as he reads Lenin's works that the famous 
revolutionary often connects the terms 11 agi tation, 11 11prop-
aganda, 11 and 11 organization 11 in his writings. He often 
refers to them seemingly in one breath: 11 agitation, 
propaganda, and organization. 11 Apparently, in his mind, 
the three terms were intimately connected. The connec-
tion may seem more reasonable than it does at first 
glance as we proceed, for the primary purpose of the 
Party was to propagate the revolutionary line and to 
organize the country for the revolution; hence the Par-
ty's own organization was vital. 
A brief review of a few historical factors may 
help one to understand Lenin's reasoning. It must be 
remembered that he was dealing with a party of Russians, 
and his organizational prescriptions seem to have been 
limited to the Russian Party. If he prescribed at all 
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for the Parties of other countries, he either did so 
seldom, or did so orally so these remarks are not in-
cluded in his works. Now, Russia was unique in a number 
of respects, especially from the point of view of a rev-
olutionary. For one, during much of the time in question 
mass assemblies and organizations, such as trade unions, 
were simply outlawed by the Russian government. In 
Western Europe, labor organizations were relatively 
common. In Russia, those organizations which were al-
lowed to exist were usually either czarist controlled 
or heavily infiltrated by the Okhrana, the secret police. 
The extent of police infiltration may be seen in the 
fact that later one of the most important Bolshevik rep-
resentatives in the Duma, Roman Malinovsky, was actually 
an agent of the secret police. Naturally, the more 
open the organization 1 the easier it would be for the 
government to infiltrate and control it. Once a group 
had been infiltrated, it was common for members of the 
group to suffer arrest and imprisonment or exile. 
Thus the autocratic nature of the Russian government 
may explain to a great extent Lenin's theory of organi-
zation and the success it eventually enjoyed. 
Yet another problem was the governmental censor-
ship; a highly organized party was needed, Lenin thought, 
to ge0 the party propaganda past the police. Further-
more, the nature of the party he envisioned affected 
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his concept of its organization. It was not to be a 
political party attempting to win elections, but a rev-
olutionary party out to overthrow not only the government 
but the entire structure of Russian society. Hence, it 
would have to be highly organizedo In What Is To Be -----
Done? Lenin summarized his arguments when he contended, 
in refutation of the 11 democratic 11 view, that 
"broad democracy" in Party organisation, 
amidst ~he gloom of the autocracy and the 
domination of gendarmerie, is nothing more 
than a useless and harmfQl ~o It is a 
useless toy because, in point of fact, no 
revolutionary organisation has ever practised, 
or could practise, broad democracy, however 
much it may have desired to do so. It is a 
harmful toy because any attempt to practise 
"the broad democratic principle" will simply 
facilitate ~he work of the police in carrying 
out large-scale raids, will perpetuate the 
prevailing primitiveness, and will divert 
the thoughts of the practical workers from 
the serious and pressing task of training 
themselves to become professional revolution-
aries to that of drawing up detailed "paper" 
rules for election systems.l 
Payne suggested yet another reason why Lenin advo-
cated a tightly organized band of a few professional 
revolutionaries for the Social Democratic Party in Rus-
sia. He argued that Lenin saw that the strength of the 
bourgeoisie lay in its organization, while the weakness 
of the proletariat lay in its lack of organization. 2 To 
1Lenin, Works Volo 5, Po 479. What Is To Be Done?, 
March, 1902. Italics here and throughout the chapter are 
in the original. 
2Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 19~ p. 282. 
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organize the proletariat for the final revolution against 
a foe already highly organized a centralized, small group 
of professionals was necessary. 
There was a definite connection in theory between 
organization and propagation of the Party line. In the 
first place, a tightly organized, centrally controlled 
party would help maintain the purity of the Party line 
that was to be propagatedo That the Party line had to 
be pure, fairly constant, and continuously advocated, is 
basically what Lenin meant in 1902 when he wrote: 
11 ••• our primary and imperative practical task 5-il 
to establish~ organisation of revolutionaries capable 
of lending energy, stability, and continuity to the 
practical struggle. 113 Furthermore, the proletariat had 
to be maintained as an independent class, free from 
ideological corruption. The workers, of course, were 
exposed to propaganda from many sources other than the 
Social Democrats. The monarchy kept up a steady stream 
of propaganda, but more dangerous by far were the bour-
geoisie who spread "democratic" propaganda among the 
workers. Bourgeois propaganda made an organized Social 
Democratic vunguard party all the more essential. As 
Lenin wrote in 1905, "The more the democratic propaganda 
and agitation conducted independently of us works to 
3Len~n, Works Vol 5 p 446 .J.. • , .. • What Is To Be -----Done?, March, 1902. 
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our advantage, the greater becomes the importance of an 
organised Social-Democratic leadership to safeguard the 
independence of' the working class from the bourgeois 
democrats. 114 
From the point of view of the Party itself', an 
organization or revolutionaries was necessary, Lenin 
thought, to use properly the forces of' Social Democracy. 
I 
Such an organ~zation was needed to carry out agitati~n 
properly. In 1899 Lenin argued: 
••• only an organised party can carry out 
widespread agitation, ~rovide the necessary 
guidance (and material) for agitators on all 
economic and political questions, make use of 
every local agita~ional success f'or the in-
struction of all Russian workers, and send 
agitators to those places and into that milieu5 where they can work with the greatest success. 
Lenin's statements concerning provision of guidance and 
material for agitators, and the use to be made o,f local 
successes for nation-wide instruction can best be under-
stood ~Y examining one aspect of the czarist censorship. 
Elsewhere Lenin explained more fully exactly what hap-
pened during, for example, a strike. Those who partici-
pated in it, naturally, knew that it had happened and 
knew what events took place, but in the majority of 
4 Lenin, Works Vol. 8, pp. 216-17. "New Tasks ond 
.New Forces,'' Vperyod No. 9, March 8 (Feb. 23), 1905. 
5Lenin, Works Vol. 4, p. 283. A Retrograde Trend 
Russian Social-Democracy, written in 1899, first 
published in 1924. 
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cases even its occurrence remained unknown by the rest 
o.f the countrya The government, he claimed, "takes care 
to cut all communication with strikers, to prevent all 
news o.f strikes from spreadingo 11 To spread the news of 
the results, or for that matter, even the occurrence, of 
a strike, a revolutionary organization was needed. 
Otherwise, he continued, the censorship would be success-
ful: the only people who would know of a strike would 
be those in the immediate vicinity, those close enough 
to be eyewitnesses or to hear about it .from the partici-
pants.6 
As more and more people came to support the ideas 
of Social Democracy, an organization, highly central-
ized, was necessary, Lenin thought, to make use of their 
time and talents. In 1902 he complained that, "A basic 
political and organisational shortcoming of our movement 
is our inability to utilise all these forces and to give 
them appropriate work. o o • The overwhelming maJority 
of these forces entirely lack the opportunity of 'going 
among the workers' •••• 11 7 Better organization would 
help solve this problem, would enable the Party to use 
the forces available. 
Not only would a highly centralized organization 
6Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 451. What Is To~ 
Done?, March, 1902. 
7Ibid., p. 429. 
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enable the Party to use the forces available, but it 
would allow them to be used most efficientlyo Here 
Lenin was concerned with the various specialized tasks 
involved in spreading the Party line, while at the same 
time avoiding the police. In 1899 he discussed the 
necessity of specialization as it related to the per-
suasive function of the Party: 
It is essential for individual Party members 
or separate groups of members to specialise 
in the different aspects of Party work--some 
in the duplication of literature, others in 
its transport across the frontier, a third 
category in its distribution inside Russia, 
a fourth in its distribution in the cities, 
a fifth in the arrangement of secret meeting 
places, a sixth in the collection of funds, 
a seventh in the delivery of correspondence 
and all information about the movement, an 
eighth in maintaining relations, etc., etc. 8 
In the same article he maintained that a single party 
was necessary to coordinate all these specialized acti-
vities, "to observe the principles of division of labour 
and economy of forces, which must be achieved in order 
to reduce the losses and build as reliable a bulwark 
as possible against the oppression of the autocratic 
government and against its frantic persecutions. 11 9 
In 1902 Lenin summarized his concept of party 
organization us follows: 
r 
8 Lenin, Works Vol. 4, p. 222. 
written in 1899, first published in 
9rbid. 
An Urgent Question, 
1925. 
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I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement 
can endure without a stable organisation of 
leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the 
broader the popular mass drawn spontaneously 
into the struggle, which forms the basis of 
the movement and participates in it, the more 1 
urgent the need for such an organisation, and 
the more solid this organisation must be (for 
it is much easier for all sorts of demagogues 
to side-track the more backward sections of 
the masses); (3) that such an organisation 
must consist chiefly of people professionally 
engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that 
in an autocratic state, the more we confine 
the membership of such an organisation to 
people who are professionally engaged in rev-
olutionary activity and who have been pro-
fessionally trained in the art of combating 
the political police, the more difficult 
will it be to unearth the organisation; and 
(5) the greater will be the number of people 
from the working class and from the other 
social classes who will be able to Join the 
movement and perform active work in it.10 
The center of the entire organization was to be a 
Central Committee. Under the Central Committee there 
,would be district groups. The primary function of the 
latter would be to organize the actual propagation of 
the Party's principles. Their main task, therefore, 
would be persuasive in natureo Furthermore, the or-
ganization for distributing propaganda material would 
eventually function as the organization of the revolu-
tion. Lenin explained this in more detail: 
LTh~ district groups_7' chief task should be the 
proper distribution of the literature received 
from the committee in accordance with the rules 
of secrecy. This is an extremely important 
I 
10 Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 464. What Is To~ 
Done?, March, 1902. 
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task, for if we secure regular contact between 
a special district group of distributors and 
all the factories in that district, as well as 
the largest possible number of workers' homes 
in that district, it will be of enormous value, 
both for demonstrations and for an uprising. 
Arranging for and organising the speedy and 
proper delivery of literature, leaflets, proc-
lamations, etco, training a network of agents 
for this purpose, means performing the greater 
part of the work of preparing for future demon-
strations or an uprising. It is too late to 
start organising the distribution of literature 
at a time of unrest, a strike, or turmoil; this 
work can be built up only gradually, by making 
distributions obli~atory twice or three times 
a montho If no newspapers are available, leaf-
lets may and should be distributed, but the 
distributive machine must in no case be allowed 
to remain idle. This machine should be brought 
to such a degree of perfection as to make it 
possible to inform and mobilise, so to speak, 
the whole working-class population of St. 
Petersburg overnight.11 
The district committee would be in charge of the whole 
apparatus within its area, especially the propagandists. 
Later in the same letter Lenin wrote that the district 
committee should instruct several of its members to 
organize a group of propagandists to be a branch of the 
committee or "one of the institutions of the committee. 11 
This group of propagandists, using the services of the 
district committee, should then conduct propaganda 
throughout the town. (It seems a bit unclear exactly 
what Lenin meant by "propaganda" but presuma:bly he meant 
the long-range educational work that the students had 
done in the worker circles in his earlier days in St. 
11Lenin, Works Vol. 6, pp. 240-41. "A Letter to 
a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks," September, 1902. 
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Petersburgo) If necessary, the group of propagandists 
\ 
should establish subgroups and ~elegate certain functions 
to them, but only with the sanction of the district 
committeeo 12 At all times the committee remained supreme 
in its district, subject only to the Central Committee. 
Lenin's basic formula for the Party's organization 
was: "The greatest possible centralization in the ideo-
logical and practical leadership of the movement, and 
the greatest possible decentralization in keeping the 
party informed about the movemento 1113 It seems that he 
recognized the dangers inherent in strict centralization 
and attempted to devise a workable alternative, since 
it was of the utmost importance that communication flow 
upwards within the organization. 
Next we must look at Lenin's discussion of the 
media for persuasion. Basically, he believed that any 
media that were available and would work should be used. 
However, although he never discussed media systematically, 
nor did he ever discuss the topic in depth, he neverthe-
less was concerned with the subject a number of times in 
his career. His concern almost always arose as the re-
sult of a specific incident which focused his attention 
on a specific medium. Thus, when a comrade was in a 
position to use a specific m~dium, Lenin offered advice 
12Ibid., PP• 241-42. 
13Payne, .2.£• cit., p. 162. 
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on how best to use ito Therefore~ we must briefly look 
at a few representative media and at Lenin's advice on 
their use. 
The Social Democrats had participated in the elec-
tion campaigns for the Duma and had won a few seats in 
the parliament. So, several times Lenin had the oppor-
tunity to advise his comrades in the Duma on how to use 
their positions to greatest advantage. Naturally, their 
speeches were to be propagandistic or agitational in 
nature, but the Duma offered other opportunities as, 
wello One which he once discussed in some depth was 
the opportunity to introduce bills. Lenin advised: 
The main aim of the Bills introduced by 
the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma must lie 
in propaganda and agitation for the Social-
Democratic programme and tactics. Any hopes 
of the 11 reformism 11 of ,the Third Duma would not 
·only be ludicrous, but would threaten completely 
to distort the character of Social-Democratic 
revolutionary tactics and convert it into the 
tactics of opportunist, liberal social-reform-
ism. • .. .. 
For Bills introduced by the Social-Demo-
cratic group in the Duma to fulfill their pur-
pose, the following conditions are necessary. 
(1) Bills must set out in t~e clearest 
and most definite form the individual demands 
of the Social-Democrats included in the mini-
mum programme of our Party or necessarily 
followin~ from this programme; 
(2) Bills must never be burdened with an 
abundance of legal subtleties; they must give 
the main grounds for the proposed laws, but 
not elaborately worded texts of laws with all 
details; 
(3) Bills should not excessively isolate 
various spneres of social reform and democratic 
changes, as might appear essential from a nar-
rowly legal, administrative or "purely parlia-
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mentary" standpointo On the contrary, pursuing 
the aim of Social-Democratic propaganda and agi-
tation, Bills should give the working-class 
the most definite idea possible of the neces-
sary _connection between factory (and social in 
general) reforms and the democratic political 
changes without which all 11 reforms 11 of the 
Stolypin autocracy are inevitably destined to 
undergo a 11 Zubatovist 11 /_Z:ubatov was chief of 
the Moscow Secret Police? distortion and be re-
duced to a dead letter.- As a matter of course 
this indication of the connection between econo-
mic reforms and politics must be achieved not 
by including in all Bills the demands of con-
sistent democracy in their entirety, but by 
bringing to the fore the democratic and specif-
ically proletarian-democratic institutions 
corresponding to each individual reform, and 
the impossibility of realising such institutions 
without radical political changes must be em-
phasised in the explanatory note to the Bill; 
(4) in view of the extreme difficulty 
under present conditions of legal Social-Demo-
cratic propaganda and agitation among the masses,-
Bills must be so composed that the Bill taken 
separately and the explanatory note to it 
taken separately can achieve their aim on 
reaching the masses"(whether by being reprinted 
in non-Social-Democratic newspapers, or by the 
distribution of separate leaflets with the 
text of the Bill, etc.), i.e., can be read by 
rank-and-file unenlightened workers to the 
advantage of the development of their class-
consciousness. With this end in view the 
Bills in their entire structure must be imbued 
with a spirit of proletarian distrust of the 
employers and of the state as an organ serving 
the employers: in other words, the spirit of 
the class struggle must permeate the whole 
structure of the Bill and ensue from the sum 
of its separate propositions; 
finally (5) under conditions in Russia 
today, i.e., in the absence of a Social-Demo-
cratic press and Social-Democratic meetings, 
Bills must give a sufficiently concrete idea 
of the changes demanded by the Social Demo-
crats and not limit themselves to a mere proc-
lamation of principleo The ordinary unenlight-
ened worker should find his interest aroused 
by the Social-Democratic Bill, he should be 
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inspired by its concrete picture of change so 
that later he passes from this individual 
picture to Ille Social-Democratic world outlook 
as a wholeo 
The Duma, then, was to be used as a sounding board to 
the greatest degree possible. The opportunity to intro-
duce bills could be of significant persuasive value. 
In 1905 Lenin elaborated on the use of a trial as 
a forum for agitation. A number of Social Democrats had 
been imprisoned in Moscow, among them one Y. D. Stasova, 
to whom Lenin addressed a letter advising them on their 
actions during the upcoming trial. He advised partici-
pation in the trial to "show up 11 witnesses and agitate 
against the court, adding a warning not to 11 slip into a 
tone of unbecoming self-vindication. 11 If a possibility 
of "showing up" the witnesses existed, the case should 
be exposed as a "frame-up." On the other hand, he recog-
nized the possibility (he apparently did not know the 
facts of the case) that the comrades might be completely 
guilty as charged, and the case against them air tight. 
In the latter case, he advised that the comrades refrain 
from taking part in the court proceedings, and concen-
trate all their a~tention on a declaration of principles. 
In either case a speech on 11 the principles, the pro-
14Lenin, Works Vol. 16, pp. 110-120 "Explanatory 
Note on the Draft of tne Main Grounds of the Bill on 
the Eight-Hour Working Day, 11 written in the autumn, 
1909, first published in 1924. 
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gramme, and the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party, 
on the working-class movement, on the socialist aims, 
and on the uprising 11 was the "most important thing. 1115 
Trials, Lenin realized, had been extremely effective. 
forums for agitation before, and he recommended that they 
be so used theno 
At various other times Lenin analyzed and advised 
on the use of other media, among them trade union pam-
phlets,16 ~ac~ory exposure leaflets, 17 and propaganda 
by exampleo 18 However, the most important medium, based 
on the amount of attention it received, was the news-
paper. The Party newspaper was to have a number of 
important,functions, primarily as an intra-Party organ. 
In 1901 Lenin wrote an article for Iskra entitled 
11 Where to Begin" in which he contended that an All-Rus-
sian illegal newspaper was what the Russian Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party needed most. Without such a paper, 
the Party "cannot conduct that systematic, all-round 
l5Lenin, Works Volo 8, p .. 69.. "A Letter to Y. D. 
Stasova and to the other comrades in prison in Moscow, 11 
January 19, 1905 (N.S. assumed because of dates of 
articles appearing around this one). 
16Lenin, Works Vol. 5, pp. 490-92. What Is To Be 
Done?, March, 1902 .. 
l?Ibid:, ppo 398-990 
18Lenin, Works Volo 33, p. 73. "Report to the 
Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Depart-
ments, October 17, 1921, 11 Bulletin of Second All-Russia 
Congress of Political Education Departments, No. 2, Octo-
ber 19, 1921 .. 
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propaganda and agitation, consistent in principle~ which 
is the chief and permanent task 11 of the Party, as well 
as the 11pressing task of the moment. 11 Agi tational at-
tempts at rousing the Russian masses were dispersed 11 in 
the form of individual action, local leaflets, pamphlets, 
etc., 11 and were not unified in content, scope or goal. 
A 11 generalised and systematic agi tation 11 could "only be 
conducted with the aid of the periodical press. 11 The 
Party tasks were 11 fragmented 11 and from this fragmenta-
tion the Party suffered both 11 ideologically 11 and in 
"practical and organisational respectso 11 The vast maJor-
ity of the Social Democrats were immersed in local work 
which unarrows their outlook, the scope of their activi-
ties~ and their skill in the maintenance of secrecy and 
their preparedness. 11 This fragmentation provided the 
roots for both ideological and organizational instability 
of the Party. The 11 first step towards eliminating this 
short-coming, towards transforming divers local move-
ments into a single, All-Russian movement, must be the 
founding of an All-Russian newspaper. 1119 
Lenin viewed the newspaper's organization as the 
primary organization prior to the revolution, and, in 
fact, the organization thnt would actually carry out 
the revolution. The newspaper's organization was to be 
19Lenin, Works Vol. 5, pp. 20-21. "Where to 
Begin 1 11 Iskra No. 4, May, 1901 .. 
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quite basic to the Party, so basic that Lenin compared 
it to the scaffolding around a building under construc-
tion, 11which marks the contours of the structure and 
facilitates communication between the builders, enabling 
them to distribute the work and to view the common 
results achieved by their organised labour. 1120 
Lenin thought that the Central Organ, as the pro-
posed All-Russian illegal newspaper was often called, 
would also serve an ideological function: it would help 
maintain the purity of the Party line as it finally 
reached the masses. The newspaper would be the ideologi-
cal leader of the Party, "evolving theoretical truths, 
tactical principles, general organisational ideas, and 
the general tasks of the whole Party at any given moment" 
witn which the agitators could then approach the masses. 21 
The Central Organ would provide aid to the local 
organizations and local agitators which they could re-
ceive in no other wayo The All-Russian paper would 
strengthen the local Party workers and preserve the 
purity of the Party line, as Lenin firmly believed it 
11 beyond the strength 11 of the individual local organiza-
tions to raise their own local newspapers to the 11 level 
of a political organ maintaining stability of principles" 
20rbid., p. 22. 
21Lenin, Works Volo 6, p .. 236. 11 A Letter to a 
Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks, 11 September, 1902. 
and to 11 collect and utilise sufficient material to shed 
light on the whole of our political life. 1122 Such mater-
ial would be provided for the local Party groups by the 
Central Organ, which they could then use to maintain 
stability of principles and to develop and keep a wider 
outlook, shedding light on the whole of political life. 
Particular problems are related to the latter of 
the above two goalso It will be remembered that the 
czarist government kept a rather rigid censorship im-
posed on all of Russiao When a disturbance, perhaps a 
strike, broke out in one section of the country, the 
police were quite successful in keeping the other sec-
tions of the country ignorant even of the fact that a 
strike had occurred, let alone any of the details of the 
disturbance. The success of the censorsnip was to be 
overcome by the illegal newspaper; it was to present to 
the Party groups in all parts of the country the facts 
of such disturbancesq Lenin gave an example in What Is 
To Be Done? which may help to illustrate this point. 
L, 
He referred to the articles printed in a local newspaper 
concerning a mine owners' convention and the problem of 
unemployment. These arcicles, he maintained, were not 
strictly local material but were required for the "whole 
of Russia." An All-Russian newspaper would have given 
22Lenin, Works Vol. 5, p. 484. 
Done?, March, 1902. 
What Is To Be ----
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those articles nationwide distribution and thus helped 
solve the problem of parochialismo 23 It must be remem-
bered throughout this discussion that the proposed news-
paper was to be illegal; it was to present facts and 
opinions which the censor outlawed. 
( 
Yet another function, or at least advantage, of 
an All-Russian newspaper would be the opportunities it 
would provide to develop Party propagandists, agitators 
and polemicistso 
If we join forces to produce a common newspaper 
this work will train and bring into the fore-
ground, not only the most skillful propagan-
dists, but the most capable organisers, the 
most talented political party leaders capable, 
at t~e right moment, o! releasing the slogan 
for the decisive struggle and of taking the 
lead in that struggle.24 
For Lenin, the two problems of organization and 
the media for propaganda and agitation became issues 
several times, the former being a central issue in his 
thought taken in its entirety? the latter being only of 
occasional significance. When a medium became an issue, 
he gave his advice. The organization? however, was of 
crucial importance, especially to get the Social Demo-
cratic Party line to the masses in autocratic Russia. 
Without a tightly organized, highly centralized, rigidly 
23 IbidQ, p. 489., 
24Lenin, Works Volo 5, Po 240 11 Where to Begin, II 
Iskra No., 4, May, 1901., 
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restricted Party, the revolution would be lost. The 
Party would not be able to get its message to the people 
and hence would never obtain powero 
The various media were all considered on an ad hoc 
basis, with the exception of the newspaper. The news-
paper was to play a central role in the Party's activi-
ties? and thus Lenin's discussion of it was much more 
detailed. The newspaper was to provide a basis for the 
revolutionary organization; it would help preserve the 
purity of the Party line, provide material for the agi-
tators and propagandists~ and develop new agitators, 
propagandists, and organizers. Lenin believed these 
functions were crucial for the revolutionary Party. 
Summary of the Study 
In this study we have traced Lenin's thought on 
the subject of persuasion as a revolutionary strategy. 
We have drawn together Lenin's writings on the subject 
and attempted to present them in a systematic manner, al-
though Lenin himself did not so present them. Since 
the mastermind of the Bolshevik Revolution was often 
concerned with persuasion, and since agitation and propa-
ganda seem to have played a decisive role in the final 
success of the Bolsheviks, a systematic presentation 
seemed justifiable. 
Classical or orthodox Marxism would seem to hold 
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that economic development by itself would be sufficient 
to generate a revolution. Although Lenin considered him-
self a Marxist, he nevertheless believed persuasion was 
necessary for revolution, an apparent contradiction. 
Therefore, in systematically presenting his thought, 
the first concept discussed was the justification for 
the existence and necessity of persuasion as a revolu-
tionary strategyo 
Lenin seems to have revised Marxism considerably 
on this point. He held that the theory of spontaneous 
generation, the theory that a revolution would spontane-
ously result from economic development alone, was dis-
proven by all past history of the working class move-
mento Lenin believed that, if left on their own, the 
proletariat would spontaneously produce only trade unions 
dealing with everyday 11petty 11 economic demands; the 
working class would never, on its own, develop into a 
truly revolutionary class. Class consciousness was pre-
requisite for revolution, and class consciousness could 
only be brought to the proletariat from outside the 
class of workers. Only the revolutionary intellectuals 
could lead the workers to become class conscious. For 
such a task, persuasion was needed. 
Agitation and propaganda were the central concepts 
in Lenin's theory of persuasion as a revolutionary strat-
egy. In tracing these two concepts, one finds that 
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each had a significant history be~ore Lenin appeared on 
the political sceneo Propaganda was the'method long 
used by the 11 intelligentsia, 11 or the student revolution-
aries, throughout Russia to widen their ranks. Propa-
ganda was a long-range proposition, an educational method 
designed to win converts to the revolutionary positiono 
It focused attention on theoretical problems, on the 
long-range development of society and of a given econo-
mic syst~mo 
Agitation, on the other hand, came into its own 
shortly after Lenin became a revolutionary. Yet it, 
too, had a significant history as a method of persuasion 
before Lenin came into contact with it. Agitation was 
a method designed to stir up the masses to seek an im-
mediate goal. At first it was economic in content, 
dealing with working conditions, wages, hours, and the 
like at the huge factories in Russia. Agita~ion, then, 
sought an immediate goal, propaganda a long-range one. 
Agitation as a method was developed among the Polish 
revolutionary groups, specifically, by the Union of Polish 
Workers, and from there spread to Sto Petersburg and 
Lenino The form in which the agitational method was 
introduced to Lenin was a pamphlet by Kremer entitled 
Qg Agitation, which was widely read and discussed among 
the intellectuals in the Russian capitalo Lenin opposed 
the new method at first, concentrating his attention 
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' on purely theoretical, literary activitieso Neverthe-
less, he did write a few leaflets for distribution among 
the workers, all of which were propagandistic rather 
than agitational in natureo 
Lenin was exiled in 1897 and spent three years 
rather pleasantly in Siberia. After returning he re-
entered revolutionary activity, soon took up the prob-
lem of agitation and propaganda, and revised the con-
cepts. By 1902 his thought had crystalized and was pub-
lished in What Is To Be Done? In this work agitation 
was defined as persuasion directed to the masses, propa-
ganda to the intellectual elite. Aqitation stressed 
one idea and illustrated it with local examples, propa-
ganda dealt with many ideas as a theoretical system. 
Agitation relied primarily on the spoken word, propaganda 
on the written word. These distinctions Lenin was to 
use for the rest of his life, more or less rigidly ad-
hering to themG 
The overall function of both methods of persuasion 
was the same: education of the proletariat. Lenin al-
ways held that the lack of class consciousness on the 
part of the workers was merely due to ignorance. If 
they were shown the truth about their class interests, 
they would recognize it as truth and believe it, thereby 
becoming class conscious. Education of the masses would 
enable them not only to become revolutionary in nature, 
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but to avoid decep-c;ion by opposicion classes and groups: 
if class consciousness were acquired, attempts at de-
ception would be recognized as such and reJectedo The 
latter was a very important consideration, since Lenin 
believed that the bourgeoisie were always attempting to 
divert the energies of the proletaria -c; to 11 harml ess, 11 
loeo, non-revolutionary, activities and beliefs. 
Agitation and propaganda also had a number of spe-
cific functions which were discussed in this study. 
They would help obtain support for the Russian Social 
Democratic Labor Party as the most basic practical func-
tion. The Party's persuasive attempts should disseminate 
scientific socialism 1 propagate democratic ideas, and 
spread an understanding of absolutism. All these would 
increase the support for the revolutionary Party. Per-
suasion would also enable theoreticians to be developed 
from among the workers themselves. It would help isolate 
the czar and the monarchists, aiding in their final 
elimination. Agitation could help stir up the peasantry, 
not a truly revolutionary class, and yet restrain them 
from excessive destruction. 
Lenin also on occasion gave specific instructions 
to agitators about the performance of their srl. _ t;.1ough 
he almost never advised propagandists. The agitator 
should, as previously mentioned, use primarily the spoken 
word, largely, perhaps, because of the widespread illit-
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eracy and the lack of mass media in Russia at the time. 
The agitator had to know how to choose language which 
his audience would understand, and, indeed, he had to 
adapt to his audience in all ways necessary to be effec-
tiveo Examples were recommended as an excellent strat-
egy, especially examples taken from the immediate locale. 
Constant repetition was another tactic recommended. 
Much material for agitation could and should be obtained 
by watching the enemya 
One of the major aspects of the content of agitation 
was the slogans which were to be advanced. A correct 
slogan summarized the proper demands of the moment~ It 
was obtained after careful study of all the forces oper-
ative in the society. It had to be implicit in the pro-
letariat; that is. to say, the slogan had to demand some-, 
! 
thing which would meet a real need of the proletariat. 
Advancing incorrect slogans was termed nphrase-monger-
ingo 11 The slogans could not be taken from the past, nor 
could they be simply catchy phrases; such were termed 
11mere II or 11 hollow 11 phrases. A true ,slogan, to have con-
tent, had to be based on the active forces within the 
society in which it was to be advanced. 
Finally, two issues Lenin raised, somewhat tangen-
tial to our central concern, were briefly considered. 
First, there was the question of organization, that all-
important question over which the Bolsheviks and Menshe-
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viks split in 1903. For Lenin, the Party was to be 
highly centralized~ and limited in membership to the 
revolutionary elite. Such a concept of the Party organ-
ization was derived largely from the fact that the Party 
had to carry on a persuasive function in an autocratic 
stateo Without an extremely tight organization, Lenin 
believed~ the Party would not be successful in getting 
its messages to the people, and thus would fail to lead 
a successful revolutiono 
Secondly, Lenin advised comrades on a number of 
occasions on the correct use of a specific medium. Three 
media were considered briefly in this study: the Duma, 
trials, and the newspaper. Lenin advocated the use for 
the best agitational advantage of even the opportunity 
to introduce bills in tre Duma. In a trial the Social 
) 
Democrat should certainly include a statement of prin-
ciples, and, if conditions permitted, attempt to expose 
the trial as a fraud. The newspaper, however, was the 
most important. Lenin thought the intra-Party, illegal 
newspaper, with its network of reportersj writers, edi-
tors, and distributors could not only provide news and 
information, but could also become the organizational 
base for the revolution~ The newspaper was crucial for 
a number of other reasons, ulso, among them being the 
purity of the Party line it could foster, the material 
it could provide to widen the scope of local Party work, 
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and the opportunities it would provide to develop agita-
tors, propagandists, and organizerso 
That the Bolsheviks were successful in their agi-
tation and propaganda can hardly be denied. No less 
can one deny the dire consequences of their success for 
the West. Perhaps a study such as this one can help us 
to understand why and how such a party, having almost no , 
support in the beginning, could, after a few short years, 
control a large share of two continentso 
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